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ABSTRACT 
 
THE EUROPEAN UNION’S DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STRATEGY IN 
MEDITERRANEAN REGION 
 
İREM BULAT 
M.A. in European Studies Program, Thesis, 2013 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler Baç 
 
Keywords:  
European Union, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, European Neighbourhood Policy, MEDA, 
Association Agreements 
 
Following the end of the Cold War, European Union followed a democracy promotion policy 
in its neighbourhood regions. The thesis aims to contribute to the external democratization 
literature by giving a detail analysis of the European Union‟s policy formation and 
instruments for democracy promotion in the Mediterranean region. More specifically, I look 
at the dynamics underlying democracy promotion policies of the EU and explain why the EU 
adopts certain policies and employ certain instruments for Mediterranean countries. As such, 
this thesis does not focus on the success or failure of democratization policies per se, but 
rather how an external democratizer, like the EU, produces principal policies and employ 
instruments for democracy promotion. Namely, this thesis tries to explain the evaluation of 
the EU‟s foreign policy towards the Mediterranean region and within this process, how the 
EU‟s policies are intensified towards a comprehensive democracy promotion strategy in the 
Mediterranean region.  
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ÖZET 
 
AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ’NİN AKDENİZ BÖLGESİNDE DEMOKRASİ TEŞVİKİ 
STRATEJİSİ 
 
 İREM BULAT 
Avrupa Çalışmaları Yüksek Lisans Programı, Tez, 2013 
Danışman: Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler Baç 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler:  
Avrupa Birliği, Avrupa-Akdeniz Ortaklığı, Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası, MEDA (Mali ve 
Teknik İlave Tedbirler), Ortaklık Anlaşması 
 
Soğuk Savaşın sona ermesiyle birlikte, Avrupa Birliği çevresindeki bölgelerde demokrasinin 
teşviki politikası takip etmiştir. Bu tez, dışarıdan demokratikleştirme literatürüne, Avrupa 
Birliğinin Akdeniz bölgesindeki demokrasi teşviki için kullandığı politikanın yapılandırılması 
ve enstrümanlarını detaylı bir şekilde analiz ederek katkıda bulunmayı amaçlamaktadır. Özel 
olarak, Avrupa Birliğinin demokrasi teşviki politikalarının altında yatan dinamiklere ve 
Akdeniz ülkeleri için Avrupa Birliğinin neden bazı belirli politikaları ve enstrümanları 
kullandığına bakıyorum. Bu itibarla, bu tez demokratikleştirme politikalarının başarı veya 
başarısızlığından ziyade Avrupa Birliği gibi bir dışarıdan demokratikleştiricinin nasıl belli 
başlı politika ve enstrümanları ürettiğine ve kullandığına odaklanmaktadır. Yani, bu tez 
Avrupa Birliği‟nin Akdeniz bölgesine yönelik dış politikasının gelişimini ve bu süreçte 
Avrupa Birliği‟nin politikalarının nasıl Akdeniz bölgesine karşı kapsamlı bir demokrasi 
teşviki stratejisine doğru yoğunlaştığını açıklamaya çalışmaktadır.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The role that external actors play on the countries‟ democratization processess has received 
increasing attention with the end of the Cold War (Whitehead 1996, Schimmelfenning 2004, 
Crawford 1997) however, studies on external democratization mostly accepted the modes of 
democracy promotion of the external actors and their strategy as given. For instance, Schmid 
(2003) analyzes the implementation of conditionality as an important instrument of the 
Europen Union (EU) for democracy promotion, without any emphasis on why the EU 
employs conditionality. The thesis aims to contribute to the external democratization 
literature by giving a detail analysis of the European Union‟s policy formation and 
instruments for democracy promotion in the Mediterranean region. More specifically, I look 
at the dynamics underlying democracy promotion policies of the EU and explain “why the 
EU adopts certain policies and employ certain instruments for Mediterranean countries”. As 
such, this thesis does not focus on the „success‟ or „failure‟ of democratization policies per se, 
but rather how an external democratizer, like the EU, produces principal policies and employ 
instruments for democracy promotion. Namely, this thesis tries to explain the evaluation of 
the EU‟s foreign policy towards the Mediterranean region and within this process, how the 
EU‟s policies are intensified towards a comprehensive democracy promotion strategy in the 
Mediterranean region.  
The EU represents a special case in democracy promotion studies. While Samuel 
Huntington‟s theory of third wave of democratization dominantly influences the literature 
towards the understanding of external democratization as a process of regime change (i.e. 
US‟s coercive measures) (Huntington, 1991), the EU‟s external actorness on democratization 
is a case study for the liberal thought, emphasizing that external democratization can be 
induced through policy change in political, economical and social spheres  (Hussain, 2007).  
Moreover, geographical proximity driven policies of the EU for democracy promotion is 
another factor to recognize the EU as a special actor in international arena for democracy 
promotion, since the EU does not seek to be global actor of democracy promotion in any part 
of the world regardless, but rather it focuses on its neighbourhood (i.e. Central Eastern and 
Mediterranean regions). Many studies point out to the EU‟s competencies in executing 
democracy promotion strategy (see Warkotsch 2008, Kamp 2007) and those studies focus on 
either certain dimensions of democracy promotion strategy such as effectiveness of one 
specific intrument that the EU employs, or the EU‟s competencies to react to non-democratic 
implications. Therefore, studying the EU‟s democracy promotion strategy based on policy 
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formation will contribute to the democratization literature. Also, my findings from this study 
can inform other areas where IGOs are seen as promoters of democracy such as Organization 
of Africa Unity in Africa  (Hearn, 1999), Organization of American States in America and 
South-East Asia Treaty Organization in South-East Asia (Sisk, 2001) 
The EU‟s democracy promotion strategy in Mediterranean is selected as a case in this thesis, 
because the EU‟s policies are dynamic and evolving in nature through the region as compared 
to the policies on post-Soviet states. Active political and social transformation in the region 
force the EU to make immediate revisions to its policy and adopt further policies (Joint 
Communication by the High Representative of The Union For Foreign Affairs And Security 
Policy and the European Commission, 2011). Moreover, the EU already integrated with 
many independent post-Soviet states after the demise of the Soviet Union while there is not 
any enlargement perspective with the Mediterranean countries. The absence of enlargement 
perspective in Mediterranean policies of the EU ends up with certain differences in modes of 
democracy promotion (i.e. non-existence of coercive measures). Moreover, the EU has not 
been able to promote such norms with the same level of success that it achieved across its 
immediate vicinity, namely the Central and Eastern Europe. Promotion of political reforms 
for democratization in the Southern countries, which have a long relationship with the EU, 
became a difficult task in which many called as a failure (Kienle, Ambiguities and 
Misconceptions:European Policies towards Political Reform in the Southern Mediterranean, 
2011). Therefore, assessment of the EU‟s democracy promotion strategy on Mediterranean 
would be attractive to test for the EU‟s competencies in external actorness on 
democratization.  
The promotion of democracy has been a major aim of the European Union‟s foreign policy 
especially following the end of Cold War (Youngs, 2001). Mutual economic interests and 
security concerns have led the European Union to invest in its relations with the 
Mediterranean (MED) countries since 1970s. The political stability of these southern 
countries, on the other hand, gained paramount importance for the EU mostly following a 
number of interrelated issues that arose in the region. From the very beginning of the EU‟s 
establishment until today; the tensions in the region such as the long-lasting Arab-Israeli 
conflict, Islamist extremism propaganda expanding to the region and the threat of terrorist 
migration into Europe prioritized the region into the EU‟s immediate foreign policy agenda. 
Therefore, the EU first attempted to develop cooperation with the region through Global 
Mediterranean Policy (formulated in 1970s) which could establish bilateral agreements until 
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1990s, and then followed by Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) (1995-known also as 
Barcelona Process) and lastly integrated under European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 
(2004). However, the EU‟s interest in democracy promotion not only augmented due to the 
necessity to secure the EU‟s on-going economic relations with the Southern countries; but 
also since the EU has started to adopt a more active foreign policy in international arena for 
political issues. Therefore, exporting democratic norms has been a guiding principle for 
policy makers in Brussels (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008, pp. 48-49). Democratization 
of the Mediterranean region, at the end, also became one of the main raison d‟etre of the EU 
and it emphasizes this logic in many platforms; as such declared in Joint Communication on 
March 2011: 
 
“Movement towards full democracy is never an easy path - there are risks and 
uncertainties associated with these transitions. While acknowledging the difficulties 
the EU has to take the clear and strategic option of supporting the quest for the 
principles and values that it cherishes. For these reasons the EU must not be a passive 
spectator. It needs to support wholeheartedly the wish of the people in our 
neighbourhood to enjoy the same freedoms that we take as our right. European 
countries have their own experience of democratic transition. The European Union 
has a proud tradition of supporting countries in transition from autocratic regimes to 
democracy, first in the South and more recently in Central and Eastern Europe.” 
(European Commission, 2011) 
 
The European Union‟s positioning itself as a democracy promoter rather than being a passive 
spectator brings the question that how democracy can be promoted actively. Which 
instruments an external actor could use to promote democracy in other countries? Which 
areas and through which means can an external actor intervene in another country‟s national 
process of transition to democracy? In order to understand the scope of external 
democratization; the first chapter of this thesis gives a general literature review of external 
democratization, main discussions in democracy promotion literature and make classification 
of the means in serving to the ends for democracy promotion of the external actor. In order to 
illustrate the EU‟s democracy promotion strategy and its external actorness, the evolution 
process of the EU‟s democracy promotion strategy in Mediterranean needs to be understood 
within the EU‟s internal political processes, therefore, in the second chapter, the EU‟s path to 
democracy promotion in Mediterranean region will be elaborated. The significance of the 
Mediterranean region for the EU; an historical overview of how the relationship is developed 
and lastly a summary of the EU‟s strategy and instruments for democracy promotion in 
Mediterranean region will be major parts of this chapter. A special focus on the EU‟s internal 
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weaknessess during and after the policy formulation will also be given; and the rhetoric of the 
EU in democratization of Mediterranean will be pointed out by referring to the major EU 
documents.  
In the third chapter, the EU‟s credibility in implementing the instruments in support of 
democratization will be assessed through a number of comparisons based on the available 
data of the European Commission‟s assistance programming documents and the data 
retrieved from previous works in the field, in order to find out whether the EU occasionally 
fails to implement the democracy promotion instruments that it plans. Of course one may 
argue that implementation is a study of change where the external actor, due to a number of 
reasons, can change the means and pace of a policy in order to respond to the challenges 
which are not calculated during policy formation. Many of the canonical works on 
democratization, for instance, look at internal factors in democratizing countries (see inter 
alia O‟Donnell and Schmitter 1987, Huntington 1997, Geddes 1999), and more specifically 
the capacity of these countries towards consolidating their regimes. While some other studies 
look at how international organizations effect democratization processes as suppliers (e.g. 
Pevehouse 2000), it is also significant to focus on to what extent these democratizers‟ 
policies are shaped from the feedback they get from the recipient countries and to what extent 
such democratization policies are resilient when faced with competing concerns such as 
trading ties, alliances, resistance by the recipient country, etc. because if such 
democratization measures are not implemented with critical decisiveness; it will not be 
reasonable to talk about their weaknesses during implementation by claiming a number of 
reasons from the recipient country‟s conditions. This thesis assumes that without considering 
firstly the competencies of the external democratizer in formulating and employing its 
democracy promotion strategy, without assessing the external democratizer‟s preferences; to 
study the assessment of the external democratization will not be persuasive. Therefore, this 
thesis will not look for the role of the EU in democratizing the recipient countries, but assess 
the supplier side, by looking into the evolution of its democracy promotion strategy and the 
consistency between the formulation and the implementation of the EU‟s own strategy. And 
finally, within this framework, how the EU increased its involvement in the Mediterranean 
region through its democracy promotion strategy will be pointed out in Chapter III to make a 
general assessment of the EU‟s external actorness in the region.  
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CHAPTER I: DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STRATEGIES OF EXTERNAL 
ACTORS 
 
This chapter will summarize the basic discussions on democratization literature about the 
policies of external actors in order to give an introductory background on the menu of options 
for democracy promotion. The key theoretical contributions in democratization such as 
Huntington (1991) and Whitehead (1996) will be the reference in understanding the essential 
elementes that an external democratizer could consider. Two basic modellings will be drawn, 
one is for the essential elements that an external actor should consider in formulation of 
democracy promotion strategy, and one is for through which means an external actor employs 
the democracy promotion strategy.  
 
1.1 External Actors in Democratization: How to formulate the Democracy Promotion 
Strategy  
The literature offers a large variety for the definition of “democracy”. While Schimmitter and 
Karl (1991), Vanhannen (1997) and Waale (1999) emphasized democracy as a system of 
governance where free and fair elections and accountability of the executive arm to the public 
exists; Huber, Rueschemeyer & Stephens (1997) considered democracy also as a guarantee 
for freedom of speech and expression of opinions, and social and economic equality. 
Democratization, on the other hand simply implies transition from non-democratic regimes to 
democracy. However, since there is a definitional variety on what democracy is and how it 
should be, the studies also varied in democratization literature. For instance, while the liberal 
thought defined the process of transition not solely about the constitutional political 
transformation such as establishment of a system where free and fair elections and 
accountability of leaders; rather democratization is a process where also the civil and political 
freedom to speak, publish and organize the political debate exists (Dahl, 1998), Huntington 
(1991) pointed out that open, free and fair elections are the sine qua non of democracy while 
he classified other elements such as „responsible‟ government, „honesty and openness‟ in 
politics as fuzzy norms which make a regime undesirable if those norms are absent, but not 
undemocratic.. Given the variety of the definition of democracy and the democratization 
process, this thesis will assess what the EU promotes; namely does the EU give a clear 
definition of democracy to promote in Mediterranean; whether the EU recognizes 
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democratization as dominantly transition for free and fair elections; or whether accountability 
and human rights are also essential.  
The democratization concept has prominently started to be discussed after the widespread 
transition to democracy in the world in 1980s and 1990s. Especially following Samuel 
Huntington‟s (1991) classification of this process as „third wave of democratization‟, the 
scholars focused on the countries‟ transition to democracy. It should be stated that many of 
those studies undermined international aspect of the democratic transformation and focused 
mainly on the domestic factors in explaining the nature and timing of democratization 
processes. Some scholars of democratization therefore addressed the legitimacy problem in 
countries by referring to the shifts in the balance of power between the moderates and 
dictator leaders in authoritarian regimes due to the decreasing legitimacy of a dictator to stay 
in power such as poor economic performance
1
 (Przeworski, 1991). On the other hand, some 
pointed out the correlation between economic modernizations, which leads to changes in 
social and class structures, and democratization (see Barrington Moore 1996, D. 
Rueschemeyer; E. Stephens, and J. Stephens 1992).  
 
It was during the late 1990s that scholars started to pay attention to the external actors‟ 
policies for democratization. Whitehead (1996) is one of the key scholars in literature who 
focuses on the actors, such as the United States (US) and the EU, who export democracy to 
the rest of the world especially after the structural changes in international arena following 
the end of Cold War. Whitehead classifies imposition of democracy under three main 
headings - contagion, control, and consent. Contagion means geographical proximity, 
implying that democratization in one country would spill-over into neighbouring countries 
(Whitehead, 1996); just like Huntington‟s identification of the key difference between the 
third wave of democratization from the previous ones as self-perpetuating “snowball 
momentum”  (Huntington, 1991). The reason why scholars after 1990s referred to the 
contagion through geographical proximity was that the fall of communism in Eastern Europe 
was recognized as a reaction to the spread of information, and the motivation of the social 
actors through the means of communication and technology (see Kegley, 1992 and Kaldor, 
                                                          
1
 Legitimacy of a dictator to stay in power is significant since the authoritarian regime itself 
does not have a mechanism of self-renewal as it is in democratic regime through elections, 
and if a dictator does not perform well to sustain its power, then democratization in that 
country is more likely to occur (Huntington, 1991). 
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1999). From this point of view; if a country or region is at geographical proximity of the 
external democracy promoter, it is more likely a country imports the democratic values and 
norms. The second heading that Whitehead introduced, control, simply implies the direct 
intervention to a country by an external actor for regime-change such as US‟s invasion of 
Panama. Control is one of the direct and so influential type of external dimension of 
democratization. The third heading, consent, on the other hand, focuses on the internal socio-
political willingness for democratization, and argues that if democratization is mostly 
internally driven, than the outer party‟s role is relegated to an indirect, supportive position.  
 
Many researchers examined how best can democracy best be promoted by international 
actors recognized as sponsors of democracy (see Ethier 2003; Burnell 2004; Stetter 2004, 
Lawson 1999). Stetter (2004) for instance puts forward that the establishment of a democratic 
regime is primarily a domestic issue in which without the political will of the government or 
the political elites; democratization cannot be steered unilaterally by an external actor 
(Stetter, 2004, p. 153). Lawson (1999), also analyzes the linkage between external democracy 
promotion in Africa in late 1980s and domestic structural variables, by concluding that 
international community can influence reforms but cannot force for democratization and also 
it is not possible to preserve sustainable democratization in the absence of economic 
modernization, good governance and civil societies within the country. According to 
Lawson‟s conclusion, the international actor is a promoter rather than the one who imposes 
democratization; and the strength of the influence for sustainable democracy is linked to the 
liberalization in the economic sphere, good governance and existence of civil societies.  
 
The relationship between liberalization in the economic sphere and political reform has long 
been one of the central issues of political theory going back to the classical theorists such as 
Smith and Hume who presented the link between political liberalization and economic 
development. When the third wave of democratization researches are reviewed, the 
considerable prominence given to the market reforms and liberal market economy as a 
precondition of democracy is apparent  (Youngs, 2001) because one of the most effective 
legitimacy of authoritarian governments for justification of political restrictions is to develop 
economic performance and attain higher level of economic development (Linz & Stepan, 
1996). The process of democratization is therefore claimed to be stronger when the economic 
freedom is extended.  
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Despite those studies are based on the dominant assessment of economic liberalization 
leading democratization, Huntington (1991) also puts forward a sensitive issue that should be 
recognized. He suggests that economic development with industrialization contributes to 
democratization; however, if a country‟s economy is getting better due to the sale of natural 
resources, such as oil, whose revenue goes to the state -not directly to the public- does not 
necessarily contribute to democratization. The reason is that the country is getting wealthier 
and the economic legitimacy of the authoritarian state continues; and also the emergence of 
middle class is not expected where the middle class‟ economic needs continue (Huntington, 
1991). Most of the studies establishing a relationship between market economy liberalization 
and democratization is also emphasizing the correlation between civil society and economic 
liberalization. Such a correlation suggested that if authority of state removed from the 
economic activity, then the autonomous economic activity leads to the widespread 
autonomous civil society which in return restrains the power of state. While Huntington 
(1991) puts forward that increased economic well-being of public adds value to the 
emergence of middle class as against to the authoritarian regimes; Beetham (1997) asserts 
that the necessary civility of social relations in a democratic polity can be protected when the 
market forces are regulated in a way to enhance democratic participation and debate; because 
the core assumption of economic modernization theory is that people demand more forcibly 
their political rights just after their economic needs had been met. Therefore; it is essential for 
an external actor to consider to support economic liberalization through industrialization and 
open trade rather than direct economic gains to the state itself.  
 
The third area of reform that external actors promote for democracy is good governance 
which is a context related to the transparency and accountability of public policy-making. 
Good governance first appeared in World Bank‟s terminology during the 1980s and since 
then the development policy of international donors including the EU promoted the political 
institutional reforms towards more transparency, accountability and rule of law (Carbone, 
2010). As being main international reference point of donors, there were some constraints 
related to the concept, since the definition of the concept shifted sharply. While good 
governance was first perceived by World Bank as an apolitical concept in which the objective 
was the development of policy-making simply for  economic development and civil society 
activism; the identification of problems in Africa‟s development as a crisis of governance 
lead the change in definition of good governance in Assessing Aid report (1998) as follows: 
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“As noted, many low-income countries fall into a gray area between good and poor 
management. Because implementing macroeconomic and trade reforms is technically 
easier than strengthening institutions (such as the civil service and the rule of law), 
these countries will often have relatively good macroeconomic policies but inefficient 
service delivery. Thus there will have to be more support for building institutions and 
implementing reforms in different sectors-more ideas, less money. A greater share of 
financing should come through projects whose value added is measured by the degree 
to which design and implementation helped improve performance in those sectors.” 
(World Bank, 1998) 
 
Since the World Bank concluded that the governing systems and institutions, as being a 
significant complementary of economic reforms, need to be supported; many donors 
including the EU, recognized political aspects of good governance – accountability, 
transparency and rule of law- as a precondition of financial aid (Carbone, 2010). Therefore, 
good governance reforms based on liberalization of political governance and its institutions, 
started to be included in the democracy promotion policies. 
 
After the general assessment of democracy promotion policies of an external actor, it is 
recognized that although little attention exists for the process of the external actors‟ formation 
of their policies, a survey of canonical democratization literature suggests a number of 
propositions on what an external actor promotes towards democratization and how such 
policy should be formulated. As one of the key concern of this thesis, the formation of 
democracy promotion strategy of the EU for Mediterranean will be assessed based on testing 
which essential conditions are considered by the EU during the democracy policy formation 
towards Mediterranean. Figure I below summarizes those conditions to be considered.  
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Figure I: Conditions to be considered by the democracy promoter for formation of 
democracy promotion strategy 
 
 
 
After formulating its democratization policy, the external actor needs to implement this 
policy through a set of instruments. The following part will address through which means the 
external actors promote democratization. 
 
1.2 Means of External Actors to Promote Democratization 
 
Classification of the instruments used for democracy promotion is a complex study due to the 
variety of the actors in international arena varying from countries having bilateral relations 
with developing countries (such as US, Germany, China) to intergovernmental organizations 
(IGO) (such as the EU, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) , the 
United Nations (UN)). While the countries‟ instruments included financial aid, economic 
sanctions, military interventions or just through classical diplomacy (Schraeder, 2003), 
Conditions to be 
Considered in 
the  Formation of 
Democracy 
Promotion 
Strategy 
What to Promote 
Democracy: Democracy should be clearly defined.; whether it implies the human rights or solely free and fair 
elections?  
Economic freedom: Economic liberalization through industrialization and open trade. 
Good governance: Political institutional reforms towards more transparency, accountability and rule of law  are 
desirable.   
Willingness  
Consent of the recepient state for external and 
domestic democratization is significant. 
How to Promote 
Domestic conditions 
Appropriate means of democracy promotion to 
be employed 
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intergovernmental institutions have focused on wider means for democracy promotion based 
on financial aid through development programs and democracy assistance (Youngs, 2001). 
The difference in the modes of democracy promotion of a country and inter-governmental 
organization is linked to the type of their formulation. A country could easily have direct 
bilateral relations as a state actor, while an intergovernmental organization such as the EU 
has multiple of actors even within itself which makes it difficult for direct decision-making 
towards a country and its recognition from a state actor‟s glance. While a country, for 
instance US, could unilaterally make pressure on a region or specific country for democracy 
imposition, the intergovernmental institutions such as the EU need to establish a convergence 
even within itself and with the partner countries. Therefore, it is more favourable for an IGO 
to act as a guarantor or underwriter of democracy, instead of being a direct exporter 
(Pevehouse, 2005). 
 
Within this variety of actors and their instruments, the traditional and most common 
classification on  the means of democracy promotion is done by many scholars based on the 
positive versus coercive approaches. The positive approaches consist of democracy assistance 
measures which means to fund the projects that would contribute to strengthening democratic 
institutions and practices. Likewise, such carrots, also relate the level of political pluralism 
and democratic institutionalization of governments as a precondition of continuation and 
development of trade and providing financial aid. In the same vein of logic, of course, 
negative sanctions refer to cases when a democratizer imposes pecuniary and/or political 
costs on the target country when such democracy targets are not met. Referring back to 
Whitehead‟s (1996) three reference modes of external democratization – contagion, control 
and consent – this classification is followed by scholars through adding up new measures, 
such as Schmitter (1996) as the one who adds the fourth category of „conditionality‟ to 
Whitehead‟s classification through taking into consideration the cases of voluntary vs. 
coercive external influences. There are other sources making different classifications all 
actually based on these four basic headings of Whitehead, with additional sub-categories or 
through different terminologies (i.e. instead of „consent‟ calling it as „convergence‟ (Kubicek, 
2003) 
 
Given the huge collection of democratization studies in transition theories, international 
relations and also in political theory; the analysis of the means of external democratization 
will not be addressed here in detail. Rather, the conceptualization of Tanja Börzel and 
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Thomas Risse (2009) will be addressed, because Börzel and Risse introduces a list based on 
the underlying principles of democracy promotion instruments; rather than referring and 
labelling each and every type of instrument as sub-categories of another instrument (see Paul 
Kubicek 2003). This approach serves to the intention of this part which is to have a general 
overview of the instruments for external democratization which will follow by the detailed 
analysis of how the EU formulate its modes of democracy promotion towards Mediterranean 
and how they employed each instrument in following chapters. 
 
Figure II: Modes of External Democratization
2
 
  
 
1.2.1 Democratization through Coercion 
 
Coercive democratization is defined by Ian Hurd as: 
 
“Coercion refers to a relation of asymmetrical physical power among agents, where 
this asymmetry is applied to changing the behavior of the weaker agent. The operative 
mechanism is fear or simple „„compellance‟‟; fear produces acquiescence. An actor 
who obeys a rule because of coercion is motivated by the fear of punishment from a 
stronger power” (Hurd, 1999) 
 
To put it simply, actors do not have any choice but have to accept the idea which is imposed 
by the external actor because they are threatened by the use of force or a considerable 
punishment. Within this scope of definition; achievement to sustainable democracy through 
the threat of war or use of physical force is controversial; because in history there are both 
                                                          
2
 The idea of this modelling is inspired from Börzel & Risse‟s (2009) classification of the 
democracy promotion instruments and own illustration from the democratization literature. 
The paper of Börzel & Risse is available on URL: http://userpage.fu-
berlin.de/kfgeu/kfgwp/wpseries/WorkingPaperKFG_1.pdf  
Modes of External Democratization 
Democratization 
through Coercion 
Democratization 
through 
Conditionality 
Democratization 
through Socialization 
and Persuasion 
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success and failure stories based on different conditions and reasons. For example; US‟s 
occupation in Iraq (2003) for the aim of establishment of democracy did not end up with clear 
existence of democratization by all means of political and social liberalization; and could not 
go further than constitution-making by the role of American Actors (Beichelt, 2012).  On the 
other hand Germany and Japan are the positive examples of coercive democratization by the 
destruction of old dictatorships by the end of World War II. The reasons of success or failure 
of coercive democratization  however is not linked by scholars to the violent character of 
coercion. When Grimm (2009) related the failure to the endogenous factors such as internal 
social conflicts, internal state failure and continuing security problems; the success is linked 
to the homogenous population having a strong tradition for state formation.  
 
Not only the use of physical threat but also the fear of punishment by a stronger actor would 
make the weaker ones to obey the imposition of democratization. For example, the national 
legislations of Member Countries in the European Union are subject to the supremacy of 
European Union Law and the Court of Justice; in which the non-adoptation of the EU 
regulations in each and every Member Country is subject to jurisdiction. The strategy of the 
EU‟s diffusion of European values and democratic norms into the member states, which is 
called as the process of “Europeanization” by Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier 
(2005), is classified under coercive democratization due to its legal enforcement mechanism. 
However, the criticisms for this mode emphasizes its underestimation of the mechanisms of 
social control and given emphasis more on policy making at state level. The normative 
content is related to the imposition through laws and regulations rather than diffusion through 
society. The EU did not aimed to employ a coercive strategy on the third Mediterranean 
countries for democracy promotion due to the belief that regime-change in Mediterranean can 
be induced through economic, social and political changes rather than direct imposition 
(Hussain, 2007). Moreover, coercion is costly not only related to the strength of democracy 
exporter‟s resources to support sustainable democratization; but also about the possibility of 
the collapse of the democratization process due to the loss of legitimacy of that top-down 
approach over time within the country/region itself (see Hurd 1999, Warkotsch 2008). 
However, the existence of the suspension clauses, which implies the political conditionality is 
recognized as coercive measure that the EU formulated under democracy promotion strategy 
towards Mediterranean partner countries (Warkotsch, 2008) because the clauses give 
emphasis on the change of rules and laws in recepient countries according to the universal 
principles.  
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1.2.2 Democratization through Conditionality 
 
Conditionality is a terminology that entered into discussions on the external democratization 
by 1980s. International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank as the major donors to 
developing countries linked its development programs to the liberalization of policies in the 
recipient country. This strategy of IMF and World Bank is in general referred as 
„conditionality‟ for development aid. The basis of this conditionality, as explained before, 
was the „good governance‟ for reforms in recipient countries. However, the definition of 
good governance evolved in time shifting from apolitical means such as economic reforms 
(structural adjustment), towards political conditionality such as rule of law, human rights and 
so on. The dissemination of governance rules through conditionality is called as „political 
conditionality‟. According to Schimmelfennig‟s (2010) definition, the governance rules of the 
donor is disseminated by setting them as conditions that actors have to meet in order to obtain 
rewards and to avoid sanctions from the external actor.  
 
Political conditionality is at the center of the EU‟s instruments towards other countries. The 
EU, as becoming an active donor in international arena
3
; is considered as one of the external 
democracy promoters and referred very commonly in studies of political conditionality; 
because the EU‟s strategy for enlargement the significant reference for how political 
conditionality works. Especially after the Cold War, new emerged post-socialist countries 
were in demand for closer relations with the EU. Since the EU had concerns about stability in 
the region and have an intention to deeper integration with eastern countries; the EU 
introduced a set of conditions that a potential accession candidate has to meet. Those 
conditions, known as Copenhagen Criteria (1993), were first introduced for potential 
accession candidates where a new member country has to  develop stable institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, rule of law, human rights and respect for minorities rights; as well 
as establish a functioning and competitive market economy and adopt the EU acquis 
(Accession criteria (Copenhagen criteria)). The EU then started to insert those conditions in 
                                                          
3
 The US reported 2.25 billion USD is spent for democratic assistance abroad as of 2008. The 
EU Member States on the other hand spent more than 1.6 billion EURO in 2006 and 2007. 
Moreover, the EU lent around 700 million EURO between 2000 and 2006 through EIDHR. 
Moreover, despite UNDP is also one of the major donors to support democracy around the 
World by financing 1.4 billion USD per year (Beichelt, 2012); the EU‟s active involvement 
in the democracy promotion deserves to be pointed out.  
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Association Agreements that are signed with non-EU neighbour countries which the EU had 
ongoing economic relationship, assuming that conditionality would work for democratization 
and economic liberalization (Schimmelfennig, Europeanization beyond the member states, 
2010)  
 
Existing studies suggest that conditionality as a tool for democratization works better in 
recipent countries that already have some democratic institutions in place (Clapham 1995). In 
non-democratic states, political conditionality would lead establishment of a limited degree of 
political space, such as strengthening of opposition against authoritarian regime. On the other 
hand, if the recepient country is in post-transition process; the conditionality would work 
better for institution building and strengthening of political institutions through democracy 
such as voting procedures, constitunional strengthening, judiciary amendments etc. 
(Clapham, 1995). The consent of recepient country is therefore significant to make 
conditionality better work for democratization. Crawford (1997) on the other hand focuses on 
the donor side in assessing the effectiveness of conditionality. He assesses the seriousness of 
donor intent based on the consistency of their response to 29 country cases where aid 
sanctions had been taken by at least one of the four
4
 donors. Crawford concludes that 
effectiveness of political conditionality depends on the strength of measures imposed, where 
the strength of measures is defined as the rehtorical support for democracy and human rights 
and equal treatment to all nations regardless of economic self-interest (Crawford, 1997). This 
thesis will look for why and how the EU formulates conditionality in its policy towards the 
Mediterranean and whether the conditionality of the EU for Mediterranean is formulated and 
employed in an efficient way, based on the approach that in the absence of a positive consent 
(as against to imposition by pressure) political conditionality would not lead sustainable 
liberalization for a long time (see Jachtenfuchs 2001, Bicci 2006 and Beichelt 2012), and the 
rhetorical support is significant in making the conditionality better work for external 
democratization. 
 
1.2.3 Democratization through Persuasion and Socialization 
 
External democratization through persuasion and socialization refers to the normative basis 
of democracy promotion rather than material. Persuasion is the situation where actors try to 
                                                          
4
 US, EU, UK and Sweden  
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persuade each other on a normative statement. The logic behind is the arguing the reasons 
behind the norms to be adopted and challenge to the counterarguments so that the external 
actor could teach the international norms to the recepient (Börzel & Risse, 2009). 
Socialization is also a course of normative diffusion approach. Socialization is the process 
where the recepient actors learn from the external actor how to internalize those new norms 
and rules to be integrated into international community; rather than  maximizing their 
utilities, such as economic benefits or receiving financial aid (Börzel & Risse, 2009). The 
basic difference between persuasion and socialization; despite both is related to ideational 
change; persuasion is done through argument and discussions when socialization appears per 
se due to the external promoter‟s appearance as a role model to recepient country (Beichelt, 
2012).  
 
The European Union is a significant case for external diffusion of norms and rules to create 
ideational change. The EU‟s approach since the very beginning of the idea of democracy 
promotion emerged (namely 1990s) is based on creating an atmosphere to share ideas, 
discuss and negotiate them. Turkey is a good example in terms of a country‟s attitude change. 
Given their long history together (since 1963 when Turkey signed Association Agreement 
with the EU);  share of ideational frames and acting along with the EU for a long time, ends 
up with Turkey‟s attitudes being similar to European style. For example; Turkey shares the 
European attitudes in the Middle East if political implications of Turkish attempts in the 
region is investigated. Aras and Bıçakcı (2006) makes an analysis of Turkish mediator role in 
Palestinian and Israeli conflict and Turkish inclusion in the Middle East, they conclude as 
follows: 
 
“The EU action plans with Israel and Palestinians within the framework of ENP 
suggest developing, among others, social, political and economic cooperation 
schemes to secure peace and stability in the region. In this sense, Turkey leads an 
Iraqi neighbourhood forum, which resembles the European neighbourhood initiative. 
This attempt is a likely starter of a security regime in the Middle East… Turkey 
emerged as a potential mediator in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These are initiatives 
that the EU was aiming to develop toward the region in the past several decades.” 
(Aras & Bıçakcı, 2006) 
 
Turkey‟s inclusion in the Middle East peace and security processes are related to the adoption 
of Turkey the European approach towards the region. Turkey follows the EU‟s path not only 
due to its own interests; but also due to the adoptation of the EU‟s ideational process that is 
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about serving as a mediator and regional player of peace and security. As it is discovered in 
Turkey-EU case, the long-term exposure of a country to an external actor‟s norms and rules 
ends up with ideational and so attitude changes, as it is discovered in Turkey-EU case.  
 
This general overview of the external democratization literature gives significant insight for 
my analysis. It is obvious that a clear answer for what is the best democracy promotion 
strategy and how it should be formulated does not exist because there is a consensus that 
external democratization is significantly correlated to the domestic conditions and each mode 
of democracy promotion could end up with success or failure. However, some common 
conclusions in literature suggests that if the external actor  clearly defines its expectations in 
the name of democratization, if the willingness of the recipient country is gathered, if the 
instruments are formulated in serving to the economic and social development as well as 
good governance and if external democratizer‟s rhetoric work with its practices, then it will 
be the time to look for the reasons of the failure of a democracy promotion strategy inside the 
recepient country. In other words, this thesis assumes that without considering firstly the 
competencies of the external democratizer in formulating and employing its democracy 
promotion strategy, without assessing the external democratizer‟s preferences; to study the 
assessment of the external democratization will not be persuasive. Therefore, this thesis will 
not look for the role of the EU in democratizing the recepient countries, but assess the 
supplier side, focusing on the consistency between the formulation and the implementation of 
the EU‟s own strategy. The following chapter will therefore look for the reasons of the basic 
research question on why the EU adopts certain policies 
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CHAPTER II: THE EUROPEAN UNION’S DEMOCRACY PROMOTION 
STRATEGY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION 
The “Mediterranean region” simply refers to the countries in North Africa (Maghreb) and 
Middle East (Mashreq) having been declared as the EU‟s partner countries under Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership and the ones at the same time being in the EU‟s immediate 
neighbourhood with no intention or foresight for membership. Maghreb countries are 
Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco; and Mashreq are composed of Syria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, 
Lebanon and Palestinian Authority. The determination of these countries as the EU‟s 
Mediterranean partner countries and the relationship that the EU developed for external 
democratization and political cooperation has a long historical root. This Chapter will 
illustrate the significance of the Mediterranean region for the EU and how democracy 
promotion comes to the EU‟s agenda. Moreover, the evolution of the democracy promotion 
strategy will be assessed based on Figure I and Figure II. 
 
2.1 The Significance of Mediterranean Region for the EU 
The European Union‟s appearance as an external actor towards the MED countries is not a 
result of a project appeared per se, but rather evolved as a result of external and internal 
political and economic necessities in a policy vacuum. With the Rome Treaties of 1957, the 
European Community (EC) was granted competences in external trade and concluded 
agreements with the third states, such as the framework of the Yaoundé Treaty which 
established relations with the member states‟ former African colonies by 1963 (Keukeleire & 
MacNaughtan, 2008, p. 43). In 1966-67, the European Commission represented the six 
member states of the EC in the Kennedy Round negotiations of General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The EC‟s external relations led the member states to consider 
their relations with the third countries and the EC appeared as an important community in 
terms of its international presence. From 1970s onwards, the EC seeks for having foreign 
policy for its external presence in international arena.  
 
The EC‟s recognition by the other states as an international actor actually led a major 
problem within the Community; because the EC was becoming an international actor on the 
eyes of the others despite the fact that the Community itself did not yet have clear foreign 
policy competences (Müftüler-Baç, 2007). European Political Cooperation (EPC) (1970) was 
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the first formal attempt for intensifying political cooperation to have a clear foreign policy. 
Since the EPC appeared to the outside world as the EC‟s common voice, and became a 
reference for the third countries for EC‟s political opinion regarding the external issues. 
Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) (1972) was the first attempt of the EU for 
Mediterranean region in terms of its objectives to treat the southern countries in a uniform 
fashion, claiming to bringing Arabs and Israelis to a closer relationship for cooperation and 
peace (Calandri, Caviglia, & Varsori, 2012, p. 30). GMP remained as a dramatic misnomer in 
terms of political ends
5
 but led to bilateral financial protocols which enhanced trade relations 
between the Mediterranean region and the Member States.  
 
The GMP remained as a dramatic misnomer since first of all it could not lead a uniform 
policy for the Mediterranean countries that had the different interests for political and 
economic ends. By December 1974, Council of Ministers abandoned the aim of a region-
wide negotiation since an oil embargo against the West has started after Arab-Israeli War 
(1973). This energy crisis caused the non-oil-producing North countries to be vulnerable so 
the balance of power shifted towards the south, especially to the oil-producing countries 
(Tsoukalis, The EEC and the Mediterranean: Is 'Global' Policy a Misnomer?, 1977). As a 
result, the Community had to develop a Euro-Arab dialogue which created a division between 
the negotiated countries. At the very beginning of GMP the aim was having a common policy 
with one common agreement, but now the Community needed to develop differentiated 
policies especially towards the Middle-Eastern oil-producing countries. However, not only 
economic ties were sufficient to guarantee the good relations but also political objectives 
were demanded by Middle Eastern countries related to the Arab-Israeli War.  
 
Oil crisis divided not only the regions, but also the Member States‟ preferences. The eight of 
the nine Community members (Britain, Denmark and Ireland became members in 1973 and 
the number increased from six to nine) joined the International Energy Agency (IEA) while 
France preferred to stay out of IEA by promoting the necessity of a more unified Community 
under these circumstances. While Greece, Turkey, Malta, Spain and Portugal were in demand 
                                                          
5
 The reason is recognized as the heterogeneous interests of the Mediterranean countries for 
political ends.  While Greece, Turkey, Malta, Spain and Portugal were in demand of 
membership to the Community; the Arabs wished to use this platform as a tool for bringing 
pressure on Israel rather than cooperation (Pierros, Meunier, & Abrams, 1999). For more 
information on GMP please see Pierros et.al. (1999)  
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of membership to the Community; the Arabs wished for bringing pressure on Israel under this 
platform rather than cooperation. The Mediterranean countries‟ interests were heterogeneous 
in this respect in which the uniformity became impossible. Moreover, the convergence of the 
member states‟ interests towards the Mediterranean in establishing a uniform GMP turned 
also into divergence of their preferences during the negotiations for free trade with the 
southern countries. Consumer-oriented Britain was interested in cheaper imports while 
France and Italy were feeling threatened by competing agricultural products of the 
Mediterranean countries. Therefore, GMP could not go forward than having signed bilateral 
financial protocols (Tsoukalis, The EEC and the Mediterranean: Is 'Global' Policy a 
Misnomer?, 1977). 
 
Despite the GMP which remained bilateral mostly and regarded as deficient, unfruitful and 
weak in economic terms by the scholars (Dağdemir, 2008, p. 154); one can claim that GMP 
was a significant exercise for the EC foreign policy towards the region, in which the EU 
could learn for further policy formations. As Laschi points out, the memory of a dramatic 
history of the EC member countries and the MED marked a protean colonialism had a deep 
impact on the whole Mediterranean policy. Laschi claims that Europe has never experienced 
to fully enter the peace negotiations on the Middle-East and therefore the EC‟s MED policies 
have failed at a political level when Arab-Israeli crisis was on the table (Laschi, 2011, p. 41). 
On the other hand; the colonial memory of the EC was experienced not only for the political 
competencies of the EC over the region, but also made the traditional north-south distinction 
much apparent even within the EC itself. While the industrially well-developed Northern 
member states were interested in economic gains over the free trade privileges to be defined 
to the third MED countries
6
, the Southern member states were reluctant in terms of their 
agricultural advantages. Given the existence of north-south distinction as well as the EC‟s 
lack of competence on political issues and divergence of interests within the EU itself, the 
project to treat the Southern region in a uniform fashion was a failure.  
 
The Cold War period‟s bipolar atmosphere also shaped the EC‟s priorities in the region 
where strategic importance of the MED countries gained a hierarchical structure on EC side. 
One of the strong drivers for the EPC was to safeguard democracy in southern Europe, to 
make the southern countries (such as Portugal, Greece, Turkey and Spain) closer to Europe 
                                                          
6
 Albania, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia 
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rather than leaving them to increasing Anti-Americanism and to respond challenges to 
European democracy from Eastern and Southern countries (Calandri, Caviglia, & Varsori, 
2012, pp. 28-29). Turkey and Greece, as countries first signed Association Agreements (AAs) 
-Greece in 1962 and Turkey in 1963-, which offers possibility of future enlargement, became 
the top of this hierarchy (Calandri, Caviglia, & Varsori, 2012). Their gradual accession to the 
common market is guaranteed by the AAs and EC‟s financial aid to prepare these key 
strategic countries to the common market conditions; while the third Mediterranean countries 
were positioned as the ones where integration is not highly necessary but rather their 
cooperation would be attained on their mutual interests. 
 
By the end of Cold War, the end of stable bipolar world would shape the parameters of 
foreign policies of the EC/EU. The EC/EU faced with major problems arising from the third 
Mediterranean countries; such as the Gulf Crisis and oil embargo against Iraq, migration, 
Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism and economic losses in return. The EC/EU‟s strategy to 
cope with the threats to the prosperity on the region was that to develop a Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) and further integrate by Member States to have a common voice 
and credibility in international arena. Under this initiative, the Barcelona Process which leads 
to Euro-Mediterranean partnership is a cornerstone in terms of Euro-MED relations. Euro-
Mediterranean partnership was a start of an initiative to through more cooperation, diplomatic 
atmosphere, more interaction and looking for common solutions through the promotion of 
democracy and the exercise of the EU‟s instruments for democracy promotion. According to 
the main conclusion of this section which is the EU failed in GMP in formulating a uniform 
policy with one general agreement for all, since when the political issues are integrated into 
discussion both the Member States‟ and MED countries‟ interests diverged. However, it 
should be pointed out that the emergence of the EPC and the attempts for an EU-wide foreign 
policy formation towards the region at the end contributed to the EU‟s presence in the region. 
For instance, in 1980 Venice Declaration, the EU has set out its policy on the Middle East by 
recognising the right to security and existence for all states in the region including Israel, and 
the need to fulfil the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people in terms of self-governance 
(EEAS, 2009). Venice Declaration was a significant attempt as the EU‟s first common 
position on foreign policy towards the region and considerable in terms of its de-facto 
existence on the political concerns which proves the EU‟s interests to actively become 
involved in the region. The next section will focus on how the democracy promotion takes its 
roots within the process of Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) formation and the birth of 
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the „partnership‟ perspective towards the Mediterranean region contributing to the EU‟s 
external actorness in the region. 
 
2.2 Barcelona Process establishing the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
 
“The Barcelona conference takes place at the exact same day when Pope Urban II, 900  
years ago in the French town, Clermont, launched the first crusade. […]” 
Manuel Marin, November 1995 
 
The European Union has been trying to establish a cooperation framework since the very 
beginning of its establishment, but the attempts until 1990s had concluded with dramatic 
failures as briefly summarized in the previous section. However, the significance of the 
region for the European Union is always tapped by the new emerging events, that did not let 
the EU to underestimate the region and give up to take further actions. The Gulf crisis
7
 in 
1990 was a considerable reason for the Union to need the promotion of international 
cooperation and security through the far Southern neighbours. Traditionally, the EU‟s energy 
supply was highly dependent on the oil transfer from the Middle East, and the energy transfer 
should be sustained through the EU. Moreover; 1990s were the times that the religious 
terrorist groups in Arab countries were becoming obviously active in their actions. Increase in 
instability and terrorist activities in some southern countries threatened Europe because of the 
possibility of terrorists‟ immigration to Europe (Gillespie, 1997, p. 66). As a substantial point 
above all, the international community were being invited by the Group of Seven (the 7 
biggest economies) at the time to „build new spirit of cooperation‟ in the Middle East. The 
EU, however, was lack of competences on political issues to have a common voice towards 
the Gulf Crisis. When the Council by the proposal of France, issued an invitation to the Iraqi 
foreign minister; the Germans and the Dutch considered to have such a meeting after the US-
Iraq one; while Italy and Spain suggested to act regardless (Kane, 2008, pp. 19-21) On the 
                                                          
7
 Gulf Crisis is a confrontation between Iraq and Kuwait that began and intensified on oil 
policies in 1990s. Iraq‟s national revenue was dependent on mostly oil exports and Iraq was 
in demand to maintain high oil prices for the repayment of its debts following Iran-Iraq war, 
however, the oil prices had dropped from $18 to $12 per barrel; in which Iraq blamed Kuwait 
for the decrease in oil prices and the conflict ends up with the Iraqi army‟s invasion of 
Kuwait. For more details on the Gulf Crisis, please see 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1991/1991-2-1.htm  
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other hand, the UN Security Council‟s resolution (678) which authorized the use of force 
against Iraq as a response to the Iraq‟s invasion of Kuwait dramatically divided the member 
states‟ preferences. While the Netherlands and the UK by sharing the American position 
rigidly supported the coalition against Iraq; Belgium, Germany and Spain opposed to the 
operation and France and Italians were flexible (Kane, 2008, pp. 19-21). The divergence of 
foreign policies of Member States is a catalyst for the necessity to define a Common Foreign 
and Security Policy and to have an EU-wide existence on the international issues.   
 
The European Council performed its functions just before the Maastricht Treaty came into 
effect, in the Lisbon European Council, regarding the agenda-setting on the „essential 
European interests‟ on geographical and functional areas on the likelihood of development of 
CFSP (Smith M. E., 2004, p. 191). The Lisbon European Council and the Council of 
Ministers approved a report addressing the factors on important common interests and the 
specific objectives. Geographical proximity of the region or country, significance of the 
political and economic stability of the region for the EU and the existence of threats to the 
EU‟s security interests are those listed factors to determine areas open to joint action of the 
EU. Maghreb and the Middle East are the addressed regions with geographical proximity as 
the EU has strong interests both in terms of economy and security concerns (European 
Council Lisbon 1992, 1992).  
 
In an unstable environment
8
, the EU‟s concerns to security in its region are a reflection to the 
objective of safeguarding the common values and fundamental interests of the Union and to 
preserve peace and international security (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008, pp. 48-49). The 
objectives for the region are clearly stated in the Lisbon European Council as fighting against 
terrorism and drug trafficking, ensuring the compliance of the countries with disarmament 
and arms control which applies to both Maghreb (Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco) and the Middle 
Eastern countries (Syria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestinian Authority) (European 
Council Lisbon 1992, 1992). Moreover, promotion of a constructive dialogue, assuring the 
principles of international law, establishment of a framework of cooperation; aiming to reach 
an upgraded 'partnership' with Maghreb countries is demonstrated; on the other hand; 
                                                          
8
 After the fall of Berlin Wall, Germany‟s reunification and the EU‟s concerns to embedding 
the German state in a stronger European entity; and moreover the Yugoslav crisis (1991) are 
the near neighbourhood security concerns, but were not emphasized in detail due to the 
purpose of the thesis concerning the Euro-MED relations.   
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regional integration, solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and Palestinian issue by UN security 
council resolutions and active involvement in the peace process in Middle East is indicated. 
 
Following the establishment of Common Foreign and Security Policy in Maastricht Treaty 
(1993); the European Council met in Corfu (June 1994) and Essen (December 1994) to 
prepare for a new route for MED policy based on the Commission proposals. In June 1994, 
the European Council in Corfu gave a mandate to the Council to evaluate, together with the 
Commission, the policy of the European Union in the MED region and possible initiatives to 
strengthen this policy in the short and medium term, bearing in mind the possibility of 
convening a conference attended by the European Union and its Mediterranean partners 
(Corfu European Council, 1994). As a response to this demand, the Commission prepared a 
proposal which offered cooperation with Mediterranean countries in the form of a Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership, rather than continuation of bilateral engagement of the past. The 
Commission suggested the importance of having regional cooperation among Mediterranean 
countries with a sustained support not only economically but also promoting human rights, 
democracy and rule of law to sustain political stability (Communication from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 1994).  
 
2.2.1 Why ‘partnership’ rather than bilateral cooperation? 
 
The risk for Greece and France is hard, but showing courage and imagination is worth for it. 
This is, absolutely, in accordance with our tradition and mentality. 
 
Mr. Javier Jiménez-Ugarte, Ambassador of Spain to Greece (2000) 
 
The EU had a long-term experience since 1970s that getting Mediterranean countries together 
with a uniform fashion which have failed since the political and economic issues were linked 
to each other and the failure in political cooperation affected the sustainability and efficiency 
of economic cooperation as well. How did the new idea of partnership emerge and how it is 
formulated to sustain a successful cooperation with Mediterranean countries?  
 
The campaign of Spain was effective in the idea of „partnership‟ rather than bilateral 
engagements, in an environment of diverging interests of the Member States during the 
conferences (Lecha, 2008). Suspension of the electoral process in 1992 in Algeria and sign of 
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unrest in other Arab countries caused some northern Europeans to worry about the spread of 
Islamist fundamentalist groups and the ideology to the Europe (Gillespie, 1997). On the other 
hand, France was willing to lead political stability in the Mediterranean region since it has 
traditional interests in the region due to its colonial history. Spain, in contrast, was actively 
promoting strategic consultations in Mediterranean issues by inviting Italy and France as well 
(Gillespie, 1997) for a common perspective. British priorities, at that time, were shifting 
towards Central and Eastern Europe. Britain, Germany and Netherlands could be persuaded 
to partnership following the strong lobbying activities of especially Spain by the support of 
France and Italy. Spain was emphasizing the need to devise a credible and comprehensive 
Euro-Mediterranean policy
9
. Economic interests of all European countries in the 
Mediterranean region became a tool of Spanish and French for persuasion other Member 
states to partnership rather than pure bilateral engagements
10
.  
 
At the end, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, for the aim of establishing a comprehensive 
common area of peace, security, shared prosperity and shared norms is declared as a common 
strategy for Mediterranean‟s peace and security (Barcelona Declaration, 1995). Barcelona 
Declaration introduced three main baskets for cooperation; political, economic and cultural 
partnership; in which each will be negotiated between each partner country for the conclusion 
of Association Agreements (AAs). The objective of the process is declared as follows: 
 
“…the general objective of turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, 
exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity requires a 
strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights, sustainable and balanced 
economic and social development, measures to combat poverty and promotion of 
greater understanding between cultures, which are all essential aspects of partnership” 
(Barcelona Declaration, 1995) 
  
                                                          
9
 Spain was interested for a comprehensive Euro-Mediterranean policy because the interest of 
Member States on Central and Eastern Europe made Spain‟s concerns that the EU would take 
Mediterranean region in a secondary position which at the end would harm Spain‟s economic 
interests. For more information please see Lecha (2008). 
 
10
 This does not necessarily mean that British, German or Dutch concerns were completely 
disregarded. It should be noted that Libya, for instance, had been excluded from a seat at the 
Barcelona Conference due to Britain and French authorities‟ sensitivity about Libya‟s 
responsibility for the Pan Am and UTA Plane bombings (Gillespie, 1997). 
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This general outlook on how the EU appeared in international arena and for the 
Mediterranean region as an external actor leads to certain conclusions. First of all, from the 
beginning of the EU‟s appearance as an external actor, there are attempts for securitizing the 
Union‟s economic and security interests. When the political issues (i.e. Arab-Israeli conflict) 
are recognized as a threat to the EU‟s interest, then the EU attempts for developing policies 
towards the region, as the case is Mediterranean, both GMP and EMP are not only structured 
for economic interests but also for political considerations. Secondly, the EU through 
Barcelona Process explicitly declared that strengthening democracy and human rights 
combined with economic interaction and social cooperation as an essential element of 
partnership. What does the „essential element‟ suggest for the MPCs to do in the name of 
democracy? How does the EU define democracy and its expectations in terms of 
democratization of countries?  The next section will elaborate on the EU‟s strategy on 
democracy promotion during Barcelona Process and explain why the EU selects certain 
instruments among the menu of options listed in Figure II.  
 
2.2.2 Spread Democratic Values as the EU’s Responsibility, not Necessarily Direct 
Regime Change in Mediterranean Partner Countries 
 
 “[…] the European Union's new Mediterranean initiative is expected to gain further 
momentum as negotiations are gradually concluded with all the Mediterranean partners”  
Commissioner de Silguy, 28 April 1997 
 
 
The question of “what the EU promotes”, namely how the EU defines democracy, is a 
difficult question to answer for Barcelona Process. The Barcelona Declaration‟s cautious 
sound of democracy clause suggest each Mediterranean Partner Country (MPC)  
 
“to develop the rule of law and democracy in their political systems, while 
recognizing in this framework the right of each of them to choose and freely develop 
its own political, socio-cultural, economic and judicial systems” (Barcelona 
Declaration, 1995).  
 
Ricardo Gomez (2003) who presents a case study of the EU‟s external Mediterranean policy 
in his book “Negotiating the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership” explains the concern of the EU 
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for democracy element by referring to the Spanish EU Commissioner Marin‟s (1992) 
statement: “There was no prior consultation between the EU and the Mediterranean states on 
what were the real needs. The concept of specificity is important. No structure can be adapted 
to countries with very different cultural heritages and social cleavages.” (Gomez, Negotiating 
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, 2003) The EU was reluctant to directly involve the 
domestic processes of the Mediterranean countries through a clearly defined structure on 
what the EU expects from each country in the name of democratization; but rather 
emphasized the necessity for greater understanding between cultures through the 
establishment of a comprehensive partnership among the participants with a general reference 
to the requirement of respect for principles of human rights, fundamental freedoms and 
equality (Barcelona Declaration 1995). This means, the European Union did not formulate its 
strategy in a coercive manner to lead a direct regime change, due to the EU‟s reluctance to 
involve in domestic matters.   
 
Axelrod‟s assessment for interaction of the actors has an explanatory power on the EU‟s 
decision: 
 
 “neither side in an economic interaction can eliminate the other or change the nature 
of the game decisively in a single move… but in security affairs; retaliation for 
defection will almost always be possible” (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985)  
 
In economic relations, as a matter of fact, actors expect that their relationship will continue 
over an indefinite period of time, while the political issues are based on more slippery 
grounds and so a long-term cooperation will be more difficult to assure. The EU‟s strategy in 
this respect was less elaborate and more general than the economic and financial partnership 
that is negotiated in detail with each country. The concern among the EU officials was if the 
attempt to multilateralize the Mediterranean policy through over-emphasis on politico-
security dimension threatens their special bilateral relationship established for many years. To 
put it more concrete; putting standards and sanctions for political and security objectives to 
some partners at the end might harm the economic ties as well. Moreover, coercion is costly 
not only related to the strength of democracy exporter‟s resources to support sustainable 
democratization; but also about the possibility of the collapse of the democratization process 
due to the loss of legitimacy of that top-down approach over time within the country/region 
itself (see Hurd 1999, Warkotsch 2008). Instead of directly referring each problem in each 
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country and referencing the EU‟s interests on each issue, the EU preferred to construct an 
international regime under the umbrella of partnership by referring to the international norms 
and rules. The EU did not act as a rule maker, instead around decentralized enforcement of 
general principles, assigned responsibility to each partner to apply the measures in their 
domestic politics. Instead of privatization to each partner for democratization clause; the EU 
preferred to multilateralize and simplify the political dimension (Youngs, 2001).  
 
Moreover, in addition to the reluctance of the EU to enter into the region for democratization 
with lack of information, there are other reasons related to the EU‟s own competences to 
create a democracy promotion strategy in a coercive manner, namely injection of regime 
change. In speaking the period of the Euro-Med partnership, CFSP was completely a second 
pillar to the community structure. It means; the decision-making in CFSP belonged to the 
Member States (The Maastricht Treaty Treaty on European Union, 1992) that makes the 
CFSP intergovernmental where the role of the supranational institutions like the Commission 
was limited. Therefore, there was the atmosphere of institutional competition within the 
Union for the decisions on external relations that mostly varied according to the areas of 
foreign policy decision. Trade policy, for instance, remained within the Commission‟s 
exclusive competence on budgetary issues of the EU‟s external commercial decisions. 
However, even in the trade policy, if the Commission‟s proposals were at odds with the 
national interests –such as the agricultural policy- of the Member States; then consensus 
among the Member States was required
11
. Despite the Member States‟ divergent interests as 
such some member states were demanding to continue with only their bilateral development 
programs for third countries (i.e. UK and Sweden), simplicity and over-generalization on 
political interests was recognized to achieve a smooth and fast negotiation process (Youngs, 
2001). This simplicity and overgeneralization led the democracy concept not to be structured 
in the EU sources with clear propositions, such as accountability and transparency, free and 
fair elections, liberalization of political and economic institutions etc., but how the EU would 
support countries‟ democratization was much apparent in its instruments which are 
formulated to serve the core areas of external democratization (economic liberalization, good 
governance and civil activism). The next section will assess the formation of democracy 
                                                          
11
 For more information on the structure and evolution of the EU institutions and decision-
making processes, please refer to McCormick (1999) and Bomberg and Stubb (2003). 
29 
 
promotion instruments of the EU with a special focus on the mode of democracy promotion 
as well. 
 
2.2.3 How to Promote Democratization?  
 
“The basic precept of the Barcelona Process is to exploit the deliberate linkage of political 
and economic policies and extract better performance on the former through the latter.” 
Mona Yacoiban, 2004 
 
Among the three baskets of partnership, the political basket aims to establishment of a Euro-
Mediterranean area of peace and stability based on common respect for human rights and 
democracy. Three instruments of the EU that are defined during the Barcelona Process serve 
to the purpose of democracy promotion: Association Agreements (AAs), MEDA (Mesures 
D'accompagnement Financières et Techniques - Financial and Technical Accompanying 
Measures) Program and Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR).  
 
To begin with, the bilateral cooperation agreements that were signed since 1970s and most of 
which would expire in 1996 are replaced with new AAs (Pierros, Meunier, & Abrams, 1999, 
p. 198). The fundamental difference of the new AAs from the earlier bilateral agreements was 
that all agreements shared general common provisions. As of 1995, a human rights and 
democracy clause is included in every Association Agreements which means the EU 
equalized the conditions for all partners on the certain principles decided in Euro-med 
conference. The common provision regarding the democracy and human rights state that: 
 
“Respect for the democratic principles and fundamental human rights established by 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) shall inspire the domestic and 
international policies of the Parties and shall constitute an essential element of this 
Agreement.”  (Leal & Deka, 2004). 
 
Considering the AAs are the agreements serving to all partnership area - political, economic 
and social – and the common provision on democracy and human rights is inserted as the 
essential element of the Agreement as a whole; the mode of democracy promotion can be 
classified as conditionality where the Agreement depends on the respect to this essential 
element. The term „essential element‟, according to the Article 60 of the Vienna Convention 
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on the Law of Treaties, lies the basis for the suspension or termination of the agreements in 
case of grave human rights violations or serious breaches of democratic process (United 
Nations, 1969). Therefore, mode of democracy promotion of the EU through AAs is a 
negative political conditionality which suggests if the democracy and human rights clause is 
violated, then the EU can suspend or terminate the agreement.  
 
As the Figure I suggests, industrialization and economic development within society is a 
significant condition to be considered and promoted by the external democratizer, because it 
fosters civil society activism against authoritarian regime. Through MEDA; the job creation 
by financing and assisting the SMEs, private investments, economic infrastructure especially 
on energy and transport sectors as well as improvement of social services from health to 
education would be sustained. The financing of the wide area of coverage is done by 
allocation of the EU financial support with direct EU incentives and European Investment 
Bank (EIB) funds (ADE-EPU-NYUA-IBM, 2003). MEDA is a program in which the 
Commission manages and implements the budget allocations, since the program itself is 
based on commercial decisions where the European Commission has its autonomy on 
decision-making (ADE-EPU-NYUA-IBM, 2003).  
 
Suspension clauses for democracy promotion are also included in the MEDA Program. The 
suspension clause states that  
 
“this Regulation is based on respect for democratic principles and the rule of law and 
also for human rights and fundamental freedoms, which constitute an essential 
element thereof, the violation of which element will justify the adoption of 
appropriate measures” (EU Council).   
 
The course of the European Union during the partnership negotiations was, as the 
Commission frequently claimed; not about imposing conditions but rather a positive and 
constructivist approach to share values and norms through dialogue (Crawford, 1997). 
Referring to such speeches; one would expect that the EU‟s course of democracy promotion 
would be only based on persuasion and socialization through norm-diffusion strategy in 
serving to cooperation and partnership for peace and security. However, then the EU inserts 
negative political conditionality, which implies suspending or terminating the benefits if the 
recepient state violates the conditions. The overall positive sound of the EMP process is 
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conflicting with such negative conditionality. Therefore, how the idea of political 
conditionality emerged within the EU needs to be stated in order to understand the cause of 
positive and negative implications within the same strategy.  
 
The evolution of the political conditionality towards third countries within the EU is first 
started to be talked within the European Parliament (EP) following the EP has gained the 
power to approve association agreements and membership applications in Single European 
Act (SEA) (1987). During the SEA negotiations, the EP desired to use this power to press on 
the countries for respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms and the EP‟s 
pressure gained some response within the Community. For instance, Dutch Presidency 
submitted a memorandum (1986) about the action taken in EPC regarding the human rights 
issues in the EU‟s neighbourhood, and the foreign ministers declared in a the annual written 
report to the EP that they are committed to promote and protect human rights and 
fundamental freedoms (EPC Documentation Bulletin, 1986).  In 1988-89, the Community 
first began to apply conditionality to Central and East European Countries (CEECs), with the 
claim that ensuring long term stability in Europe is based on transformation of those countries 
that are in near abroad of the EU. The implementation of conditionality began without a legal 
basis. The countries that were performing well in reform process are received more 
Community financial assistance (i.e. Hungary and Poland) where if human rights are violated 
in a country (i.e. Bulgaria, Romania) then the Community witheld the prospect of an 
agreement (Smith K. E., 1997) The financial aid is linked to the political and economic 
reforms without mentioned in financial aid regulations
12
.   
 
It was in June 1993, where the Copenhagen European Council agreed to enlarge with the 
CEECs only if certain accession criteria are met, including democracy, human rights, rule of 
law principles (Smith K. E., 2003). This political conditionality that links the political 
reforms to the economic benefits is then extended to the Community‟s relations towards other 
third countries, since it helped to the CEECs political transformation and the Community 
should use this tool in serving to stabilising other regions as well. On 29 May 1995, the 
Council agreed that all agreements of the Community with third countries should contain a 
suspension mechanism that enabling the Community to react if the essential elements are 
                                                          
12
 Regulations no. 3906/89 in OJ L 375, 23 December 1989 and no. 2698/90 in OJ L 257, 21 
September 1990 
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violated. Since the political conditionality is formulated in a way that all agreements that the 
Community signs with third countries shall be based on respect for fundamental principles, 
then this applied for the Association Agreements of the EMP process as well (Smith K. E., 
1997).  
  
Actually, the human rights and democracy clause included in each Association Agreement 
provided persuasion measures also, that supports the Commission‟s positive rhetoric. 
Referring to the Article 5 of each AA, regular meetings at ministerial and official level 
provided to be coordinated on regular meetings for raising and discussing the issues of 
concern in the region as well as in creating a sense of ownership is formulated (Leal & Deka, 
2004). However, the dialogue tool at the same time was not complemented by any identified 
measures outlining how democracy should be attained. The reluctance of the EU to explicitly 
define democracy and the EU‟s expectations limits the EU‟s discourse to discuss the genuine 
achievement for democracy through dialogue, which made the tool of dialogue vague at the 
end for the recipient countries (Molla, 2009). Moreover, as it was discussed in Chapter I, 
political conditionality is a successful experience of the EU where the EU used the 
enlargement carrot. In other words, enlargement is the biggest carrot in democratizing the 
countries since the expectations of the candidate for a full integration of the EU‟s free market 
at the end is encouraging to meet the political conditionality (Palombo, 2013). In the absence 
of such carrot, the EU aimed to encourage the MPCs to obey the essential element of 
democracy and human rights through dialogue, which has its own weaknesses; through the 
AAs itself encouraging the partner countries for trade opportunities and financial assistance 
such as through MEDA which is an encouraging tool for the recipient countries.  
 
The MPCs in the region were composed of heterogeneous synthesis of various religious and 
ethnic groups, the region was characterized by unequal economic development and huge gaps 
between the countries‟ economic indicators13 and also the countries were coping with the 
problems related to the demographic explosion such as significant levels of unemployment. 
Above all, the Islamist fundamentalist movements in the region make the authorities to take 
certain actions towards the regime protection, but at the same time they were willing to get 
                                                          
13
 GDP per capita in the region varies from 1.301 USD in Palestine authority to 17.310 in 
Israel as of 1995. The figure is available on World Bank Databank: 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx 
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the EU‟s financial assistance and free trade opportunity for economic development (Behr, 
2010). Therefore; the developments for democratization in MPCs were remaining as on-paper 
initiatives in order to sustain relationship with the EU. Given this case; to commit those 
countries with suspension clauses would not lead material results but rather stimulate window 
dressing attempts of MPCs. 
 
Egypt is one of the failures of Barcelona process in terms of reversing the trend towards the 
political de-liberalization due to the unwillingness of the authority. Before the Barcelona 
Declaration; by June 1992, Egypt‟s penal code and the law concerning the Supreme State 
Security are amended in an environment of increasing political violence by the dominant 
ruling party, NDP. The amendments were concerning any threats to the stability of the 
regime, namely the NDP‟s authority, would be punished through repressive measures as such 
the prison terms were replaced with forced labour, temporary sentences with life sentences, 
and life sentences with the death penalty (Kienle, More than a response to Islamism: The 
Political Deliberalization of Egypt in the 1990s, 2009, p. 222). Those harsh penalties are 
directed to the people or groups performing terrorist acts, however, the definition of terrorist 
in the amended penal code covered a wide range of activities of use of force and even any 
kind of threat of the use of force. Those measures in Egypt‟s laws were against the armed 
Islamist militants; but after coming into force, led to the increasing control of professional 
syndicates, organizations and even political parties to guarantee the survival of the 
authoritarian rule of NDP (Blaydes, 2011, p. 36).  
 
The Barcelona process did not reverse the on-going political de-liberalization in Egypt. Just 
after the AA (signed in 2001) came into effect in 2005 the constitution is amended for more 
than one candidate to be stand for presidency. This is a good attempt through the fair 
elections and plurality as one of the principles of democracy. However, the oversight of the 
elections at the same time transferred from the courts to regime-appointed commissions 
which in return brought speculations on the weigh on election results. Moreover, as reported 
by the Egyptian Organization of Human Rights, 12 people were killed and 500 were injured 
in election related violence in 2005, compared to 8 killed and 64 injured in 2000 (Democracy 
Reporting International (DRI), 2007, p. 16). Another substantial observation states that the 
government has referred to the „security‟ concerns in order to justify the creation of security 
cordons which prevent opposition voters from accessing polling stations (Democracy 
Reporting International (DRI), 2007, p. 16). The constitutional amendments in Egypt serves 
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to the democratization like a window dressing; what on paper seems like a certain 
development that in fact does not add value to the development of rule of law and democracy. 
 
Egypt was a one but not only example to the political de-liberalization in shape of 
„liberalization‟. Jordan, for instance, faced with the dissolution of the parliament by the King 
Abdullah II four years later the AA is signed with the EU, and the legislative power to enact 
laws passed to the King‟s authority. A couple of amendments have been introduced to the 
electoral law which introduced small quota for women and minorities, that seemed a good 
step towards implementation of the principle of democracy; but the law in general derived 
from the manner favouring the rural voters over the urban voters in return for strengthening 
the King (Kienle, Ambiguities and Misconceptions:European Policies towards Political 
Reform in the Southern Mediterranean, 2011, p. 12). After considering such examples, the 
EU‟s economic tools are encouraging for the recipient states to get the advantage, but at the 
same time they had to obey the essential element, given the weaknesses of the EU in its 
dialogue tool which is vague in terms of defining the EU‟s expectations in the name of 
democracy at the end leads no substantial developments under political partnership for 
democracy promotion. The following section will assess the loopholes of the EU‟s strategy 
that might cause the failures.  
 
2.2.4 More than a Policy, less than a Strategy 
 
“For all that, must Barcelona be seen as a failure? Certainly not. For at least three reasons. 
We are working better together. We are working more together. We have already identified 
the future projects to be worked on.” 
Javier Solana, 2003 
 
The Euro-Mediterranean partnership is, as this Chapter assessed is a comprehensive 
democracy promotion formation. The EU does not define explicitly what it expects from 
democratization, but rather overgeneralize the concept on the international norms and values 
as such the respect for human rights, rule of law and fundamental freedoms. Moreover, all 
means of democracy promotion, except coercion, is apparent. The reason, as discussed, was 
that the EU first needed to recognize the real needs of the country through ministerial level 
conferences, to discuss the issues and develop cooperation and partnership rather than to 
appear as a rule maker. However, what the EU lacked was the existence of coordination 
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mechanisms for the instruments, namely the financial ones such as MEDA and EIDHR. 
Although a human rights and democratization unit was established within the Commission; it 
was given very limited powers where the geographical divisions within national foreign 
ministries dominantly remained in charge of human rights and democratization aids. This 
means the Member States separately funding the same area without having an exact figure on 
what the Commission or the other Member States were doing. This creates a simple lack of 
pooled information on what different actors within the EU funding in recipient countries; and 
therefore leading to the difficulties in the EU-wide assessment of democracy assistance 
(Youngs, 2001). The recipient countries were benefiting from the EU‟s sources but the EU 
itself was lack of competences to manage and follow up its own implementation. Moreover, 
there was a precise conflict between the Member States and the Commission regarding the 
division of responsibilities for the co-ordination of the funds for democracy and human rights 
promotion; since the Member States were criticizing the Commission about the quality of 
work in terms of slowness in implementation and complex bureaucratic procedures for the 
allocation of political aids
14
 (Youngs, 2001). 
 
The European Commission after the five years of Euro-Mediterranean Partnership submits a 
general overview of the process to the Council and European Parliament before 4
th
 ministerial 
Euro-Mediterranean meeting; and proposes „reinvigorating the Barcelona Process‟. The 
commission, in terms of the EU‟s weaknesses of EMP from the EU‟s side, assesses the 
process stating that: 
 
“The spirit of partnership has not led to a sufficiently frank and serious dialogue on 
issues such as human rights…implementation of the MEDA programme has been 
hampered by complicated procedures both in EC and in partner countries…There is a 
need to draw a number of lessons from initial period and to reinvigorate the 
process…the programming and implementation of assistance must be improved in 
                                                          
14
 It should also be emphasized that between 1996 and 1998, United Kingdom brought a 
number of suitcases before the European Court of Justice against the European Commission. 
The United Kingdom was claiming that the Commission‟s role for about 86 projects‟ funding 
abroad from the Commission‟s budget had no basis in the Community Law. The European 
Court‟s opinions to the judgments state that a regulation needs to be adopted for the 
Commission‟s competence in allocating EU funds. That is another reason for revising the 
MEDA regulation, following the Commission gets the power to be able to allocate funds 
from the EU budget in 1999 (Youngs, 2001). The related case numbers are C-106/96, C-
239/96, C-240/96, C-305/96. The cases are available: http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/ 
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order to enhance strategic content, to sharpen its focus and increase its impact.” 
(European Commission, 2000) 
 
After the reinvigoration process, the EU establishes National Indicative Programs and 
Strategy Papers for the allocation of funds to each country according to their performance in 
political, economic and social spheres. Therefore, MEDA between 1995 and 1999 is called as 
MEDA I and since 2000 as MEDA II (ADE-EPU-NYUA-IBM, 2003).  
After pointing out the limits of the EU in democracy promotion strategy during EMP, it can 
be concluded that monitoring and follow-up mechanisms would add up value to the EU‟s 
democracy promotion strategy. The Euro-Mediterranean partnership became an experience 
for the EU to recognize its own abilities to become an external actor in international arena, 
and how it can deal with its internal limitations so that it could achieve its objectives abroad 
for democracy promotion.  
The overall assessment of the EU‟s strategy for democratization in the Mediterranean 
suggests that the formation of the democracy promotion strategy was less than a strategy in 
terms of coordination and management, but more than single policies since a comprehensive 
structure of different means are interrelated under one objective.  Despite the existence of 
negative conditionality in AAs, the financial aid instruments such as MEDA are aimed to 
support to encourage the recipient countries to engage in the EMP process. Moreover, all 
MPC at the end signed the AAs (see Table I below) except Syria.  
Table I: Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements 
 
Country Start of Negotiations Agreement Concluded Agreement Signed Entry into Force*
Algeria June 1997 December 2001 April 2002 September 2005
Egypt March 1995 June 1999 June 2001 June 2004
Israel December 1993 September 1995 November 1995 June 2000
Jordan July 1995 April 1997 November 1997  May 2002
Lebanon November 1995 January 2002 June 2002 April 2006
Morocco December 1993 November 1995 February 1996 March 2000
Palestine  May 1996 December 1996 February 1997 July 1997**
Syria March 1998 October 2004/December 2008***
Tunisia December 1994 June 1995 July 1995 December 1997
Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements
* *To the benefit of the Palestine Authority, Interim Agreement signed by the European Commission and the Palestinian National Authority 
on behalf of PLO, without the Member States' sign due to the legal status of PLO to sign international agreements. For more information 
please visit:  http://www.medea.be/en/countries/occupied-palestinian-territories/eu-plo-agreement/ 
***In 2008 the Association Agreement with Syria was revised. It was planned to be ratified on 26 October 2009. However, Syria indefinitely 
postponed signing the Association Agreement with the European Union.
*To enter into force, each Association Agreement must be ratified by the European Parliament, the Parliament of the Partner Country and 
the Parliaments of the Member States of the European Union.
Source: The Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements : http://www.iemed.org/anuari/2010/aarticles/euromed_agreements_en.pdf
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Javier Solana
15
 evaluates the process of Euro-Mediterranean Partnership during the 6
th
 Euro-
Mediterranean Ministerial Conference as: 
 
“In less than ten years, Europe as a body has developed contractual relations with 
virtually all its Mediterranean partners. The cooperation projects accompanying these 
association agreements have given rise to frustrations. A review of their management, 
thanks to efforts by the Commission and the associated States, is now bearing fruit. In 
terms of both quantity and quality, there are few cases of bilateral cooperation which 
can claim to be doing better. Europe is assuming its natural role as a partner of the 
Mediterranean countries. (Solano, 2003) 
 
In the following section; the EU‟s further initiatives for democracy promotion will be 
assessed based on whether the EU took certain attempts to go further in its democracy 
promotion through a better monitored and coordinated strategy.  
 
2.3 From EMP to ENP: A shift in Democracy Promotion Strategy to fill in the loopholes 
that are recognized in Euro-Mediterranean partnership 
“Our neighbourhood policy goes beyond the horizon of the on-going enlargement. An 
enlarged European Union must be capable of speaking with one voice and acting credibly and 
efficiently in the world. A comprehensive neighbourhood policy is an important element of 
this project” 
Günter Verheugen
16
, 2004 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is a foreign policy initiative of the European Union 
which was launched on May, 2004 with a Strategy Paper of the Commission. The policy was 
first outlined in a Commission Communication paper in 2002 in which the Commission 
President, Romano Prodi, suggested a new neighbourhood policy to offer “more than 
partnership and less than membership...” (Prodi, 2002). The objective of ENP then had been 
endorsed at the European Council of 2003 as “…to make a particular contribution to stability 
and good governance in our immediate neighbourhood [and] to promote a ring of well 
                                                          
15
 Secretary General of the Council of the European Union/High representative for 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
 
16
 Member of the European Commission 
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governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the 
Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations" (European 
Commission, 2004).  
The creation of good neighbourly relations with Eastern non-member countries became 
necessary for the Union‟s security and stability at home. Although accession agreements 
were seen as significant for the neighbour countries‟ economic and political transformation 
through European values, enlargements were actually costly for the EU in terms of further 
integration (Mahncke & Gstöhl, 2008). On the other hand, past experiences in external 
relations with the southern neighbours were not satisfactory to the EU. Experiences proved 
that the understanding of partnership based mostly on economic instruments but suspension 
clauses would not work for domestic transformation of countries (Mahncke & Gstöhl, 2008). 
Moreover; in the wake of September 11; the war in Iraq, Islamist extremism propaganda 
expanding to the region and the threat of terrorist migration into Europe and the security 
tensions such as long-lasting Arab-Israeli conflict lead the EU to take further actions and put 
more emphasis on political and security cooperation which is introduced in Barcelona 
Process. During the ENP formulation process; the significance of the Southern neighbours 
were again emphasized as well as the Eastern countries.  
According to the Commission Communication of December 2006, the EU aimed to create a 
single policy framework for all Eastern and Southern neighbouring countries (European 
Commission, 2006). However, under this single policy framework, the EU emphasizes that 
“Development and reform in our partner countries is primarily in their own interest, and it is 
their sovereign responsibility” (European Commission, 2006). This means that the EU would 
continue its strategy for not using coercive measures in terms of imposition of democracy 
through the threat of suspension clauses, but further would put emphasis on „joint ownership‟ 
which was already expressed in 2004 Strategy paper as “Joint ownership of the process, 
based on the awareness of shared values and common interests is essential. The EU does not 
seek to impose priorities or conditions on its partners.” (European Commission, 2004)  
The European Commission states in Regional Strategy Paper (2007-2013) and Regional 
Indicative Program (2007-2010) that: 
“The political situation in many of the countries of the region is characterized by the 
need to further democratic reforms, including free and fair elections and respect for 
the rule of law and for fundamental freedoms and human rights. While constitutions 
in the region often provide for freedom of thought, opinion and association, legal 
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provisions may also stipulate numerous restrictions, in some cases under the pretext of 
safeguarding national security or national unity. In recent years several countries have 
made considerable progress in these areas. At the same time, the rapid rise of 
moderate and reformist political Islam movements as well as political extremism has 
put severe pressure on political regimes in the region and sometimes slowed down 
progress towards more political openness and pluralism. Unresolved conflicts are also 
perceived as obstacles to reforms.” (European Commission, 2007) 
In comparison with the EMP, it is now clearer that the concept of democracy is upgraded 
during the European discourse within the context of the ENP. Now the EU adds up the 
expectation for reforms in addition to the political dialogue.  Based on the broad consensus 
that political reform is positively correlated with achievement to sustainable security and 
stability in the region; the „more for more‟ principle adds positive political conditionality to 
the AAs. Moreover, the EU needed to consider the political situation in each Mediterranean 
partner countries. In order to better coordinate the strategy with a focus on each country‟s 
domestic situations, Action Plans were introduced by ENP as major difference from EMP 
process.  
Action Plans are negotiated agreements that take into account the explicit needs of the partner 
countries based on the progress reports prepared by the Commission (Mahncke & Gstöhl, 
2008). Action Plans are short-term instruments covering a timeframe of 5-years. The 
objective of Action Plans was not replacing the existing treaties (Association Agreements). In 
contrast, Action Plans cover a wide array of political, legal, economic and social objectives in 
the form of the previous agreements‟ supplementation as a framework and work program for 
measures to be taken (Mahncke & Gstöhl, 2008).  Those measures can be summarized as 
political dialogue and reform for democratization, economic development, cooperation on 
justice, freedom and security, cooperation on sectors such as energy, transport, environment, 
science and lastly people-to-people areas such as civil society, public health and cultural 
cooperation. By March 2007, Action Plans had been agreed on with Israel, Palestinian 
Authority, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia (Mahncke & Gstöhl, 2008). The 
ENP Action Plans contained chapters with specific and agreed objectives for reforms on the 
rule of law, political democracy, basic human rights and fundamental freedom; which is 
defined as the principles of „good governance‟ in international arena. The Table II below 
demonstrates the Action Plans that are signed with the Mediterranean ENP countries: 
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Table II: Adoption of the Action Plans, by Country 
 
The Action Plans, despite they are tailor made, shares common outline and framework with a 
special section on democracy and rule of law under the Political Issues main heading in each 
country‟s Action Plans. This section includes the components for democracy and rule of law 
that are identified and jointly agreed by the EU and each partner country. Those components 
in general refer to the participation in political life, enhancing the role of the civil society, 
guaranteeing judicial independence, and promoting human rights, fundamental freedoms and 
respect for the rule of law
17
. Referring to this section, one can claim that it becomes more 
obvious that the EU now has a procedural definition of democracy in a liberal manner and 
also now the EU is on the way to have a democracy promotion „strategy‟ with explicitly 
defining what it promotes and what it expects from the partner countries to follow in terms of 
democratization.  
Moreover, in order to monitor the implementation progress of the chapters in Action Plans, a 
specific sub-committee is established under the European Commission called as Human 
Rights and Democracy (HRD). HRD sub-committee is established to assess the progress 
reports
18
 of the partner countries and in case any development through democratization; 
additional allocations to be disbursed under the new program called as European  
Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) as a single management mechanism and with a 
single set of procedure (European Commission, 2004). ENPI is new in terms of being an 
allocation mechanism for all partners, regardless of their region (European Commission, 
2007). MEDA Program is integrated under ENPI instrument as well. This approach also 
                                                          
17
 The action plans are available in the European Commission‟s website through the link: 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm 
 
18
 Progress reports are the follow-up mechanism of the European Commission which 
evaluates on a yearly basis the developments of the recipient countries in terms of the 
objectives of the agreements with the Community. The progress reports are available in the 
European Commission website through the link:  
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm 
Country Israel Jordan Tunisia
Palestinian 
Authorities
Morocco Egypt Lebanon Algeria Libya
Adoption 
by the Country
April 2005 June 2005 July 2005  May 2005 July 2005 March 2007 January 2007   -   - 
European Neighborhood Policy Action Plans
Source:The Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements : http://www.iemed.org/anuari/2010/aarticles/euromed_agreements_en.pdf
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removes the bilateral and regional program division. As it was under MEDA there were two 
programs for financial aid; one is aimed for financing domestic political reforms and another 
one was for regional development projects. Now all budget allocations are under ENPI 
instrument. The objective is the simplification of procedures on the allocation of financial 
aids, and to directly focus on cross-border cooperation and related activities as differentiated 
from the internal procedures of the EU (Mahncke & Gstöhl, 2008). However, it should be 
emphasized that the clear figure for the conditions and procedures regarding the management 
and decision-making of funding again has not been determined (Lippert, 2007).  
Table III: The EU‟s Democracy Promotion Strategy (own collection) 
 
As a conclusion of this Chapter; the Table III above is a summary of the EU‟s democracy 
promotion strategy and instruments demonstrating the development elaborated in this 
Chapter. It can also be concluded that the EU is well aware of the certain weaknesses of its 
strategy witnessed during the Barcelona Process and seems to develop its instruments to 
complement the loopholes in its strategy and instruments during ENP process. Well, how 
much the new strategy of the EU; with a more focus on each MPC through newly introduced 
Action Plans and progress reports, with a positive political conditionality rather than 
negative; and also with a more strategic approach in monitoring and evaluation of domestic 
INSTRUMENTS 
MEANS OF
DEMOCRACY 
PROMOTION
EU'S DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STRATEGY IN MEDITERRANEAN
EUROPEAN 
NEIGHBORHOOD POLICY (2004 onwards)
 - Negative political conditionality through 
suspension clauses
 - Association Agreements
 - MEDA Program
 - EIDHR
CORE AREAS OF 
DEMOCRACY 
PROMOTION
 - Positive political conditionality through 
reward by additional financial aid 
 - Norm-diffusion strategy: shared 
prosperity, partnership etc. 
BARCELONA PROCESS (1995-2004)
 - Economic Liberalization
 - Civil society activism
- Good governance
 - Economic Liberalization
 - Civil Society Activism
 - Good Governance
 - Action Plans (monitored by National 
Indicative Programs and annual progress 
reports)
 - ENPI
 - EIDHR
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issues of the recipient countries would of the EU‟s democracy promotion? Chapter III will 
make the critical assessment of how the EU implements its democracy promotion strategy. 
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CHAPTER III: ASSESSMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S CURRENT 
DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STRATEGY 
The EU‟s foreign policy towards the Mediterranean region is an evolving and developing 
process where the EU experiences its own weaknesses and strengths to become an active 
democracy promoter, and that is how the policy formation is improved in a policy vacuum as 
a response to certain failures such as in the examples of Egypt and Lebanon and its own 
weaknesses such as lack of coordination and follow-up mechanisms. As a result of this 
evolving nature of the EU‟s strategy, the EU increased its involvement in the Mediterranean 
region as an external democratizer through the implementation of democracy promotion 
instruments. The chapter will follow by the most current developments within the EU 
towards the improvement of foreign policy coordination and the critical assessment of the 
EU‟s credibility. The current position of the EU‟s involvement in the region will also be 
touched upon.  
This chapter will assess basically the Commission‟s financial aid instruments for democracy 
assistantship and state the increasing trend in both the commitments and payments of the aid, 
but with a critical assessment of the EU‟s own performance as well. Bicchi (2010) 
recommends that analysis of the impact of democracy assistance is not useful without taking 
into account whether it has actually been implemented. By taking this approach into account; 
and since the purpose of this thesis is to analyse the EU‟s strategy but not the effectiveness in 
making the countries more democratized, the following sections will assess whether the EU 
now performs in accordance with its strategy or regardless, more specifically whether the EU 
is credible with its policies in practice. In order to make this assessment, the financial aids 
under MEDA and the latter under the ENPI are selected as test cases.  
Moreover, the EU‟s credibility in performing its strategy will be evaluated on its current 
political conditionality under ENP based on the progress reports and the trend of the 
allocation of funds. Such examples of comparisons can be applied to other instruments as 
well, such as EIDHR, but such a comprehensive analysis would better serve to the studies 
asking for the efficiency of the EU in implementing its instruments. This Chapter rather looks 
for the answer of the simple question of credibility implying in this thesis that whether the 
EU implemented the tools in a way they are formulated or act regardless. The answer might 
then lead to other questions such as whether the EU promotes one area of democratization 
more than others or whether the EU can efficiently employ its instruments in democratizing 
those recipient countries, that suggests further research beyond the objective of this thesis.  
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3.1 Lisbon Treaty’s Implications for ENP 
 
Treaty of Lisbon which came into force in 2009 has done significant reforms in the EU‟s 
external relations, especially on the blurred three pillar structure. The EU gains a legal 
personality in external relations with the establishment of a High Representative for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy. The difference of High Representative position is that now the 
position would not be held by the Secretary-General of the European Council, but appointed 
with the agreement of the President of the Commission by the QMV (qualified-majority 
voting) of the European Council. The appointed High Representative would also be one of 
the Vice-Presidents of the Commission. In order to support the High Representative, 
European External Action Service (EEAS) consists of personnel from the Council General 
Secretariat, the Commission and staff from national diplomatic services would be established. 
Therefore, EEAS working for CFSP also
19, did not fully left to the Member States‟ power but 
rather the significant supranational institution, Commission, is also given a role. In addition, 
since the appointed High Representative is also a Vice-President of the Commission, this 
means that his/her activities were bounded by the Commission procedures
20
. As a last and 
significant point, the European Parliament (EP) had a role in CFSP indirectly, because EP has 
a power on the Commissioners‟ appointment in the way for giving consent to the whole 
Commission‟s appointment or dismissal. The High Representative as a Commission‟s Vice-
President is subject to the EP‟s consent in his/her appointment. In brief, the current CFSP is 
organized through more cooperative policy integration with the existing supranational 
institutions but within its own structure the decision-making is still at the hands of the 
Member States. Despite there is not in practice a considerable change in this respect, the 
establishment of the High Representative position and the EEAS adds value to the presence 
of the EU in international arena in terms of formal EU-wide foreign policy existence.  
 
Following this brief introduction to the Lisbon Treaty in terms of the institutional reforms for 
CFSP, it should be emphasized that certain implications for the ENP is apparent in the Lisbon 
                                                          
19
 EEAS work not only for CFSP, but also for Common Security and Defence Policy and the 
European Neighbourhood Policy, but its overall objective is about supporting the Union‟s 
foreign policy activities coordinated by the Commission, staff from Member States and the 
European Council.  
 
20
The paragraph is summarized from: (Directorate General External Policies of the European 
Union, 2008, s. 3-5) For the Article references of the Treaty please refer to this document.  
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Treaty. Referring to the Article 8 of the Treaty, the common values, differentiation and the 
strengthening the positive conditionality are the fundamentals of the ENP right now. 
Although the ENP was already structured on those listed objectives, the basic difference was 
that following the Lisbon Treaty, the strategy is explicitly defined in the Joint 
Communication of High Representative and the Commission as “incentive-based approach 
based on more differentiation („more for more‟)” (European Commission & High 
Representative, 2011). Although in theory the Association Agreements implies negative 
conditionality, this instrument had never been visited by the EU, and also following the 
Lisbon Treaty, the Joint Communications referring to ENP revision explicitly emphasized for 
positive conditionality. However, some EU officials, such as the ENP Commissionner 
Stephen Füle, criticisized the EU‟s preference by stating that “commitments are unfortunately 
not always matched by action…in line with the conditionality principle, a clear and 
systematic link must be made between the outcome of the benchmarks assessment and EU 
support” (Maurer, 2012). Namely, Füle emphasizes the necessity to focus more on the actual 
implementation of the policies adopted. Moreover, the ENP review document also points out 
that there is not a necessity to change the principle of conditionality itself, but the EU should 
focus on how to “provide the mechanisms and instruments fit to deliver these objectives” 
(European Commission & High Representative, 2011). Based on the Lisbon Treaty and the 
ENP revisions afterwords, the implementation of what has been formulated is a significant 
concern of the EU. The following sections will assess the weaknessess in implementation of 
the policies from the beginning of the EU‟s democracy promotion strategy and the 
developments in terms of implementation after the revision of ENP for this objective.  
 
3.2 Democracy Assistance: Does the EU allocate more funds to good governance under 
ENP as compared to MEDA?  
The EU became a major donor in the region following EMP. Between 1995-2006, around 7 
billion Euro is allocated from the EU budget which would be disbursed both at bilateral and 
regional level to the partner countries. Except for Israel, Turkey, Malta and Cyprus
21
, all 
                                                          
21
 Israel is not a beneficiary because of its high level economic development. Turkey was a 
beneficiary of MEDA until 2002; but due to the change of its position to becoming a 
„candidate‟ to EU membership, Turkey benefits from a separate funding program. The same 
applied for Malta and Cyprus from the beginning of the program due to their special position 
towards membership.  
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Euro-Med partners were included for bilateral cooperation. While bilateral cooperation 
targeted the development of each partner‟s domestic development; regional cooperation 
aimed the MED partners‟ sub-regional initiatives through intensifying regional cooperation as 
well as cooperation of non-governmental entities.  
The program had two phases until a new Mediterranean policy is launched under the 
European Neighbourhood Policy initiative. The first period of MEDA between 1995 and 
1999, around 3.5 billion euros are committed from the EU budget and in the second phase 
between 2000 and 2006, around 4.3 billion euros are committed with a relatively more 
strategic approach by comprehensive overview of the projects with standardized 
programming (Estruch, 2007, pp. 11-17). For bilateral partnership, each country is allocated a 
portion of the budget according to the European Commission‟s decision; and each partner 
increasingly benefited from the EU investments for the improvement of government and civil 
institutions for political liberalization and socio-economic development. The table below 
demonstrates that the commitments of the EU budget for the partner countries did not 
demonstrate a high and considerable increase from MEDA I to MEDA II; but its payments 
over commitments almost tripled. This Table IV demonstrates increasing interest of partner 
countries for the EU funds. 
Table IV: Financing from MEDA I to MEDA II in terms of Commitments and Payments 
 
 
Although the commitments and payments explain on the partner countries‟ interest for 
cooperation in terms of financial aids; the problem with MEDA program in terms of 
Commitment Payment
Payments-to-
Commitments Ratio 
Commitment Payment
Payments-to-
Commitments Ratio 
WBG 111 59 53% 522,3 486,4 93% 86%
Jordan 254 108,4 43% 331,4 345,5 104% 78%
Tunisia 428 168 39% 517,6 489,2 95% 70%
Egypt 686 157 23% 592,5 695,4 117% 67%
Morocco 656 127,5 19% 980,1 917,4 94% 64%
Algeria 164 30,2 18% 338,8 142,3 42% 34%
Turkey 375 15 4% 0 0 0% 4%
Lebanon 182 1,2 1% 132,7 181,5 137% 58%
Syria 101 0 0% 179,7 90,9 51% 32%
Total 2957 666,3 23% 3595,1 3348,6 93% 61%
471 222,5 47% 739,8 477,8 65% 58%
3428 888,8 26% 4335 3826 88% 61%
Source: European External Action Service: http://eeas.europa.eu/euromed/docs/meda_figures_en.pdf
Total P/C
B
il
at
e
ra
l
MEDA I to MEDA II, Commitments and Payments, 
by Countries, Million Euro
MEDA I (1995-1999) MEDA II (2000-2006)
Regional
Grand Total
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democracy promotion was that it is difficult to find out which portion of the increased 
amounts of financial aid was in the name of democracy assistance, namely the funds for 
development of democratic institution-building; in other words for „good governance‟. 
According to Vera van Hüllen‟s (2009) study, there had been virtually no related projects 
under MEDA I, not surprisingly since MEDA I provided financial aid only for economic 
development such as structural adjustment facilities, private sector development projects and 
institution building support for economic and environmental aspects (ADE-EPU-NYUA-
IBM, 2003). During the MEDA II it was relatively easier to determine the projects funded 
directly for democracy assistance due to the approach that the EU funds are allocated based 
more on bilateral National Indicative Programs (NIP). Hüllen compiles the total aid figures 
for 7 countries‟ projects related to the judiciary and penal systems, civil society and 
governance from the NIPs of European Commission. Table V below consolidates the data of 
total allocations in Table IV and the portions disbursed for democracy assistance based on 
Hüllen‟s collection.  
 
According to the figures, there has been a steady increase in funding for democracy 
assistance from MEDA I to MEDA II. One can claim that the EU‟s relatively more strategic 
approach through bilateral focus for democracy assistance in MEDA II as compared to 
MEDA I suggests that the EU started to follow a strategy for democracy promotion towards 
giving emphasis on the democratic liberalization of recipient countries at institution building 
level. If this is the case; then one would also expect that democracy assistance under ENPI 
South would considerably increase in terms of its portion in overall financial aid to the 
countries; because the significance of good governance in partner countries is firstly and 
obviously stated during ENP process‟ rhetoric and related documents of the policy22. In order 
to see the case; the amounts of payments under ENPI South are also added to the Table IV.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
22
 Please see again Chapter 2 of this thesis. You may also refer to ENP Strategy Paper (2004) 
for more details. 
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Table V: Payments for Democracy Assistance under MEDA I, MEDA II & ENPI South 
 
 
Figure III: Democracy assistance portion in total payments 
 
 
The figures demonstrate that there is not a significant change in the total amount of financial 
aid to the countries in sum, from MEDA II to ENPI South. The portion of financial aid for 
democracy assistance in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and Syria increased while 
certainly decreased in Algeria and Tunisia. However, in the overall assessment there is not 
Total 
Payment
s
Payments 
to 
Democracy 
Assistance
Total 
Payments 
w/o 
Democracy 
Assistance
Democracy 
Assistance/
Total 
Payments
Total 
Payment
Payments 
to 
Democracy 
Assistance
Total 
Payments 
w/o 
Democracy 
Assistance
Democracy 
Assistance/
Total 
Payments
Total 
Payments
Payments 
to 
Democracy 
Assistance
Total 
Payments 
w/o 
Democracy 
Assistance
Democracy 
Assistance/
Total 
Payments
Algeria 30,2 5 25,20 16,56% 142,3 48 94,10 34% 220 17 203 8%
Egypt 157 0 157,00 0,00% 695,4 25 670,40 4% 558 40 518 7%
Jordan 108,4 0 108,40 0,00% 345,5 7 338,50 2% 265 17 248 6%
Lebanon 1,2 0 1,20 0,00% 181,5 10 171,50 6% 187 22 165 12%
Morocco 127,5 4 123,50 3,14% 917,4 33 884,70 4% 654 28 626 4%
Syria 0 0 0,00 0,00% 90,9 2 88,90 2% 130 30 100 23%
Tunisia 168 0 168,00 0,00% 489,2 34 455,55 7% 300 0 300 0%
WBG 59 -  -  - 486,4  -  -  - 632  -  -  -
Total 651,3 9 583,30 1,38% 3348,6 159 2703,65 5% 2946 154 2792 5%
222,5 - - - 477,8 - - - 343,3  -  - 
873,8 3826,4 3289,3Grand Total
ENPI South (2007-2010)
MEDA I, MEDA II  & ENPI South Payments,  by Countries, Million Euro
Source: European External Action Service: http://eeas.europa.eu/euromed/docs/meda_figures_en.pdf ; Hüllen (2009) and Europa: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/0703_enpi_figures_en.pdf
MEDA I (1995-1999) MEDA II (2000-2006)
B
il
a
t
e
r
a
l
Regional
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any increase in the portion of the democracy assistance funds under ENPI as compared to 
MEDA II - it remains on 5% level - as against to the overall rhetoric and theory of the ENP 
suggesting to allocate more funds on the projects related to good governance. One can claim 
at this point that if there is no demand from the recipient country for aid to develop its 
institutions for good governance; the EU would not be able to disburse such funds. If so, then 
the EU‟s political conditionality which applies to all funding decisions comes to the front to 
be evaluated; since if there is not an intention of the recipient country for further 
democratization, then the theory of the EU‟s conditionality suggests for additional measures 
to be taken rather than continuation of financial assistance.  
 
3.3 Political Conditionality: Does the EU consider conditionality in allocation of funds 
 
In theory; disbursement of the EU aid is conditional on democracy, human rights and reforms 
for good governance in recipient countries. The more those countries demonstrate 
developments through democratization, the more financial aid they would get; and vice versa. 
Does the EU in reality demonstrate credibility to enforce political conditionality and allocate 
the funds accordingly? In order to find a solid answer to this question, the country progress 
reports, which the European Commission records the developments in each country that 
signed the Action Plans, would be helpful in comparing the findings with the funds allocated. 
Among the countries having signed Action Plans, the data is collected for Egypt, Lebanon 
and Jordan
23
 from their annual progress reports, strategy papers and National Indicative 
Programs for the 2007-2010 and 2011-2013 periods.
24
 Table IV below summarizes first the 
EU‟s25 analysis on the political situation of the partner country and the strategy for the 2007-
                                                          
23
 The progress reports for Tunisia and Morocco were available only in French. Scarpetta and 
Swidlicki (2011) summarized the 2010 progress reports of these two countries in their study; 
however was not enough for the scope of my study. If interested please see their work as 
cited (Scarpetta & Swidlicki, 2011). Palestinian Authority and Israel are intentionally not 
included since Israel already is not receiving any democracy assistance fund due to its mostly 
functioning democratic institutions; and comparison of Palestine with other countries in the 
region would not be valid since there is also the aspect of Middle East Peace Process which 
the EU has a special interest to support Palestine intensively.  
 
24
 All European Commission‟s assistance programming documents are available on Web. 
Please see: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm 
 
25
 The assistance programming under ENP is done by the European Commission and the 
“EU” especially implies the “Commission” in this part of the Chapter.   
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2010 periods including their allocated budget for the program. Second, the summaries of the 
progress that the EU recorded in each country towards political democratization during the 
period are included as well. Finally, the EU‟s average (for each year) allocations under 
MEDA II and ENPI are demonstrated, including the parts for democracy assistance.  
 
Table VI: The EU Funding Trend vs. Progress on Democratization 
 
Strategy Paper Progress Reports
2007-2013 2008 & 2009 & 2010
2000-2006 
2007-2010 2011-2013
Lebanon
1) The kidnapping of two Israeli 
soldiers by Hezbollah armed militia 
triggered a 34-day conflict in July and 
August 2006. The political situation is 
still strained.Lebanon had been unable 
to avoid the structural problems at the 
root of the instability of the country. 
2) In a Ministerial Declaration of July, 
the Government outlined a broad 
agenda of essential political and 
economic reforms.
3) While Lebanese laws and the 
Constitution are in general conducive 
to protecting human rights, 
concerns about infringements of 
human rights remain. Several sources 
have emphasized the need to 
reform the functioning of the judiciary, 
among others, as regards respecting 
international standards for 
fair trials and conditions in Lebanese 
prisons.
4) An anti-corruption law was drafted 
in 2002, but is still waiting to be 
adopted.
Progress was achieved in the area of 
electoral reform and should be 
consolidated.
The Constitutional Council was re-
established just before the 
parliamentary elections in June 2009. 
Lebanon was one of only two countries 
in the ENP South region which invited, 
and received, an EU Election 
Observation Mission (EOM). The EOM 
praised the high voter turnout of 54%, 
an increase of 8%compared to 2005). 
Nonetheless, it repeated many of the 
recommendations of its 2005 
predecessor and underlined its support 
for the proposals made by the National 
Commission on electoral law.
In area of Judicial reform; procedures 
are lengthy and 
inefficient and the judicial system is 
perceived to lack credibility and 
transparency.
No progress was achieved in the 
administrative reform strategy
22 million 
EURO
of which 1.6 
million 
EURO is 
disbursed 
for 
democracy 
assistance
33 million 
EURO
of which 5,5 
million EURO 
is committed 
(and all 
disbursed) 
for 
democracy 
assistance.
50 million 
EURO 
of which 8.3 
million EURO 
is committed 
for 
democracy 
assistance
Country
Average Allocations 
of ENP Funds (in terms of Commitments)
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Strategy Paper Progress Reports
2007-2013 2008 & 2009 & 2010 2000-2006 2007-2010 2011-2013
Egypt
Structural Problems:
Low participation in political life, the 
exclusion of certain political movements and 
groupings from the political arena, a fragile 
culture of democracy and of recognition of 
civil and political rights, centralisation of 
powers and decisions, continuation of the 
emergency law, guaranteeing the 
independence of the media, freedom of 
expression and assembly, and the 
independence of the judiciary are other key 
challenges for political reform.
Human Rights:
Issues of concern to the EU are the use of 
torture, poor prison conditions, corruption 
and gender-based discrimination. 
Judiciary:
Lack of independence from the executive, the 
backlog of cases, delays in resolving disputes 
and the persistence of the Law on the State of 
Emergency. The general situation in a number 
of prisons and detention centres is poor.
Constitutional Reforms in 2007 for 
structural change are introduced 
but the results are limited. The 
State of Emergency is still in place 
as a major obstacle for human 
rights and fundamental 
freedoms. In May 2008 it is even 
extended for a further 2 years. 
No progress made until 2010 for 
independence of judiciary. 
Limited progress is recorded 
against torture and ill traitments; 
also for pormotion of women's 
rights. The number of court 
actions against activists increased 
and many of them are trialed 
under Emergency rather than civil 
law and sentenced to prison.
99 million 
EURO
of which 
4.1 million 
EURO is 
disbursed 
for 
democracy 
assistance
140 million 
EURO
of which 10 
million 
EURO is 
disbursed 
for 
democracy 
assistance
150 million 
EURO
of which 
13million EURO 
is committed for 
democracy 
assistance
Jordan
1) The Constitution gives the King a high 
degree of legislative and executive authority; 
the role of political parties needs to be 
reinvigorated. 
2) Jordan’s rank in the 2006 Transparency 
International Index is 40, the best 
performance in the 
region, and has adopted an anti-corruption 
law in October 2006.
3) One of the most advanced countries in the 
region for political reforms but the 
government is facing increasing difficulty in 
getting reforms through the current 
parliament.
4) Violence against women and, in particular, 
crimes committed in the name of honour, 
remains a serious cultural issue.
5) A municipal elections law is drafted, to 
allow for the direct election of mayors 
(currently appointed by the King). 
The electoral system known as 
“single non-transferable vote” 
tends to result in votes being cast 
for individual candidates and is 
widely acknowledged to be 
disadvantageous towards the 
development of political parties. 
King Adbullah tasked the new 
Government (which took office in 
December 2009) to amend the 
“Elections Law” in view of the 
new parliamentary elections 
(expected no later than 2010), 
further to the dissolution of the 
Parliament in November 2009.
Anti-Corruption Commission is 
not yet operational but Jordan 
was ranked performing far better 
than most countries in the region.  
It is now prohibited to arrest 
anybody for the expression of his 
opinion in oral, written or any 
other way, but heavy fines may 
still be imposed. 
55 million 
EURO
of which 1 
million 
EURO is 
disbursed 
for 
democracy 
assistance
66 million 
EURO 
of which 
4,3 million 
EURO is 
committed 
(and all 
disbursed) 
for 
democracy 
assistance
74 million EURO
of which 15 
million EURO is 
committed for 
democracy 
assistance
Country
Average Allocations 
of ENP Funds (in terms of Commitments)
52 
 
 
The information gathered from the EU‟s sources suggests that from 2007 to 2010, Egypt and 
Lebanon showed almost no considerable progress for good governance and human rights. 
Moreover, Egypt is recorded as even getting worse in terms of continuing to protect existence 
of State of Emergency. Jordan, on the other hand, is recognized as one of the best countries in 
the region for political liberalization, despite some limitations its performance is considered 
as well in compared to other partner countries. The EU itself is more aware of the domestic 
conditions of recipient countries than as it was during EMP; therefore based on those records 
the EU could make the ENPI instrument in serving to the political conditionality as it is 
already in every country‟s signed Association Agreements. This conditionality is intended to 
work for positive approach under ENP, which means the more those countries demonstrate 
democratization, the more financial aid they would get; and vice versa. However, it is 
obvious that each country is increasingly benefiting from both overall ENPI budget allocated 
to them and for good governance part of it, despite being still a very small portion. The 
allocation of the funds seems to work regardless of the condition in the recipient country. As 
a conclusion of this overall analysis on the EU‟s funding actions for democracy assistance in 
recipient countries; the EU itself implements the instruments regardless of the policies that it 
formulated. 
 
3.4 To what extent the EU’s democratization policies are resilient when faced with 
competing concerns? 
The formulation of the democracy promotion strategy within the EU is discussed in Chapter 
II. Regarding the suspension clauses, the EU‟s preference was to referring universal values 
instead of determining the way for democratization in each country; and the expectation that 
each country would adopt measures to respect for international norms and values, within their 
own governance systems. In order to achieve this objective the EU formulated the suspension 
clauses that are inserted in each Association Agreements and financial aid programs. The 
suspension clauses implied suspending or terminating the benefits if the state in question 
violates the conditions. This startegy is classified in literature as political conditionality 
where the linking of perceived benefits such as financial aid, trade concessions, to the 
fulfilment of conditions related to the democratic and human rights principles (Jepperson & 
Alexander Wendt, 1996).  
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 As it is stated, one of the objectives of this thesis was to look not only for how the 
conditionality of the EU for Mediterranean is formulated within its internal political 
processess, but also to look for the EU‟s credibility in terms of implementing the policies as 
they are formulated. The popular Arab uprisings in the Arab world have led the EU to 
implement the instrument it had traditionally been reluctant to use in the region, that are the 
sanctions and suspension of relations.  
 
The case of Syria and Libya are significant in terms of those two countries do not have an 
Association Agreement that is signed during and after Barcelona Process but they have 
relations with the EU based on trade cooperations. Libya is a specific case where the EU has 
strong interests on especially oil and gas contracts and trade relations but reluctant to develop 
more cooperation due to the UN sanctions on Libya and the member states‟ concerns about 
terrorist activities arose in the country (Koenig, 2011) Following the uprising in Libya, the 
EU applied a set of sanctions that are designed to interrupt the flow of weapons and money to 
the Gaddafi regime (Koenig, 2011) that are followed by  multinational military operation 
under NATO that defeated the violent government forces. Currently the EU running a 30 
million € program in Libya in order to support the regime formation based on democratic 
principles (European Union External Action).  
 
In contrast to Libya case, Syria is a special case in the region since neither the protestors 
succeeded to ousting Bashar Al-Assad nor the international use of force is relevant. The 
relations of Syria and the European Union date back to the bilateral cooperation agreement 
signed in 1977 and during the EMP process, Syria was the only country which signed the 
Barcelona Declaration, the Association Agreement is negotiated, concluded but not ratified 
from Syrian side. However, Syria continued to benefit from financial aid. Trade relations, on 
the other hand, continued to be based on the existing cooperation agreement. Given the 
absence of Association Agreement, the EU continued to support Syria through financial aids 
for the aim of full participation of Syria to ENP since the EU recognized the Syrian 
government‟s efforts for reforms, although less in political area, through economic and social 
liberalization
26
.  
                                                          
26
 In the strategy paper of Syria for 2007-2013 it is stated that “10th Five-Year Plan for 2006-
2010 as the blueprint for comprehensive economic and social reform and transition from a 
centrally planned to a „social market economy‟. Political reform is at this stage less 
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The EU, despite long-term trade and investment relations with Syria, immediately during the 
Foreign Affairs Council of May 2011 announced the suspension of bilateral cooperation 
programs between the Syrian government and the EU under the financial aid instruments of 
ENPI and also declared that the EU will not take further steps on the Association Agreement 
with Syria, as a response to the ongoing violent repression of protests.  
 
Another case that the EU applied sanctions is the case of Egypt. In early 2011 the anti-
government protests started in Egypt, that is called as the Egyptian Revolution, against 
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarek in demand for the end of emergency law, freedom, justice 
and non-military government (Portala, 2012). In return, a violent repression in mid-March 
2011 a military junta took over the governance that ends up with a violent repression for the 
protestors (Portala, 2012). The EU‟s response is, according to the Council Decision in 2011 
was “freezing of funds and economic resources of persons identified as being responsible for 
the misappropriation of Egyptian State funds, and natural or legal persons, entities and bodies 
associated with them” based on a list of natural and legal persons27 .  
 
The suspension of all bilateral relations as a response from the EU side with Syria, given the 
absence of any legal agreement requiring to do so, and also referring to the Libya case where 
the EU allocate funds for democratic institution building; and lastly the EU‟s sanctions on 
Egypt are demonstrating that the EU is acting credible with its rhetoric that suggests to 
become an active promoter of democratization in the region, rather than staying a passive 
spectator. 
 
3.5 The EU’s Inclusion in Mediterranean Region 
 
The active existence of the EU in MED region increased its involvement in the region and 
provided some mutual gains to both the EU and the MPCs, however remained very limited if 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
prominent on the government‟s agenda. However, the 10th Baath Party Congress of June 
2005 has given some orientations in this area, so has the Euro-Mediterranean Work 
Programme endorsed by Syria and its regional partners at the Barcelona +10 Conference.”  
Available online: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_csp_nip_syria_en.pdf 
 
27
 The Council Decision in 2011 and the list is available online via: 
http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measures_en.pdf#page=47 
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the ambitious objectives such as the creation of free trade area is considered. The initiatives 
of the EU developed the trade flows between regions, which at the end can be seen as a 
positive implication for the development of the region towards open and liberal economy. 
Despite the Association Agreements aimed to create a free trade zone by 2010, trade gains at 
the end remained at bilateral level but in speaking a region-wide development, intra-regional 
trade remained very limited. Trade with the Maghreb countries demonstrated over 4.4% of 
overall EU trade in 2008 and from 1995 to 2008, the increase in trade volume was around 
3,5%. For the Mashreq, trade volume decreased from 1,45% of overall EU trade to 1,24% for 
the period between 1995-2008 and in 2011 it becomes 1,19% (Kirişçi, 2011). When 
compared with the EU‟s Eastern neighbours, the overall EU trade between 2004-2011 is 
increased by 50% with MED region while it is 156% with the Eastern ENP countries (Kirişçi, 
2011). The reason of the limited progress on trade is explained by Kirişçi (2011) as follows: 
 
“This meagre performance is partly caused by the inability of these countries to adopt 
and implement the EU acquis on the internal market. The reasons behind this inability 
are complex and numerous but the insufficiently valuable “carrots” offered by the EU 
to induce reforms is also a factor to be reckoned with. This, in turn, is closely related 
to the EU‟s considerable resistance to opening the internal market to agricultural 
imports from the southern Mediterranean. Instead, energy and related products have 
constituted the bulk of EU imports from the region perpetuating the “rentier state” 
nature of many Arab economies.” 
 
 
The limited nature of the EU‟s inclusion in regional trade is critical for the democracy 
promotion strategy of the EU in terms of making this significant carrot to become ineffective 
at the end. More specifically, creating open and liberal economy, as discussed in Chapter I, is 
one of the core element considered to foster political liberalization towards democratization, 
but in the EU-MED case, this element became a weak achievement.  
 
As it is recognized, to foster the EU‟s involvement in the region, the willingness and ability 
of the partner countries to adopt and implement the EU‟s acquis in their internal market and 
induce reforms. The EU‟s involvement in the MED region with a more differentiated 
approach, in this respect, would serve better in future to the EU‟s external actorness and its 
involvement in the region. The more for more strategy which is adopted during and after the 
Lisbon Treaty, in the long run, suggests “a much higher level of differentiation allowing each 
partner country to develop its links with the EU as far as its own aspirations, needs and 
capacities allow” (European Commission & High Representative, 2011). The EU‟s 
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differentiated approach allows each MPCs to integrate with the EU on different policy areas 
according to their willingness and ability to do so. The revised ENP suggests that “for those 
southern and eastern neighbours able and willing to take part…includes closer economic 
integration and stronger political co-operation on governance reforms, security, conflict-
resolution matters, including joint initiatives in international fora on issues of common 
interest” (European Commission & High Representative, 2011).  
 
To consider each country‟s willingness to integrate on different areas with the EU is 
significant in terms of the EU‟s democracy promotion startegy in the future, since the EU 
already experienced the long-term negotiations for the AAs and the Action Plans which 
demonstrate that the more a country is willing to democratization and integrate with the EU, 
the more they demonstrate progress on the certain initiatives to be concluded. For example, 
Jordan is a verification case for considering the EU‟s differentiated approach to be effective 
in the region. Referring back to Table VI, Jordan is recognized, among all others in the 
region, as one of the most advanced countries in the region for political reforms, human 
rights and promotion of peace processess in the region. Jordan is also the partner country, 
among others, who concluded the AA and Action Plans negotiations faster than others in the 
region (please refer back to Table I and II). Therefore, the EU‟s differentiated approach 
would better serve to its inclusion in democratization of the countries, as the common 
conclusion that the literature also suggested (please refer to Chapter I).   
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CONCLUSION 
 
The EU experienced internal shortcomings from the very beginning of the formulation of its 
democracy promotion strategy towards the MED region, but attempted to develop its strategy 
in an evolving pattern in order to respond both to the internal and external challenges rather 
than giving up to employ the policies. At the end, the EU recorded certain achievements to 
promote the establishment of sustainable democracy, from a policy towards a comprehensive 
strategy through definitional support for the EU‟s expectations on democratization, 
formulation of supportive instruments, to make the rhetoric work in practice and finally 
through a differentiated approach work with each recipient based on their willingness and 
ability to integrate with the EU. The question of to what degree the EU as an external actor 
could democratize those countries was out of discussion for the thesis objective, but what 
needs to be considered is that the EU‟s inclusion in the region through implementation is 
improved over time.  
As per the findings of this thesis, the European discourse on democracy promotion as a 
response to the political, economic and security issues arose in the Mediterranean region has 
its own limits due to its own competences. First of all, when the EU first attempted of a 
policy formation under EMP towards democracy promotion; the conclusion was a lack of 
clear message of what democracy is and how the EU expects from the partner countries for 
transition to democracy. Moreover, the instruments that the EU formulated to serve for the 
democratization policy were lack of certain coordination and management mechanisms. 
Those weaknesses were the reflection of the EU‟s member states‟ preference and inter-
institutional competition, which at the end led to a general and simplified approach in 
external democratization rather than completely involving to the processes in recipient 
countries.  
Members such as France, Italy or Spain enjoyed close relations with the Mediterranean 
counterparts, due to their security and trade interests, and therefore were reluctant to act in a 
coercive manner for a direct regime change. Germany and Britain, on the other hand, were 
interested more on the Eastern Europe where they were sensitive for an active policy towards 
Mediterranean through high pooling of resources to the Commission‟s budget. At the 
supranational level, the Commission was blamed by mismanagement of the process and 
moreover acting without any given role to allocate funds abroad by the European Community 
(referring to the 12
th
 footnote). The reason why the EU did not ever employed coercive 
58 
 
measures, which implies in this thesis as a US‟s style of direct intervention or the EU‟s style 
of deepening processes with the Member States through supranationality of the laws and 
regulations over the national laws, was that at the beginning the Spain‟s strong lobbying 
activity among Member States for a more cooperative policy, claiming for not to threaten 
economic and trade gains. Afterwards, even the EU preferred non-coercive tools such as 
financial aid, trade and economic benefits based on the Association Agreements, the EU did 
not give emphasis on to evaluate the democracy promotion strategy on each country 
separately, that provided a basis for the recipient countries for window dressing of their 
domestic implementations in the name of democratization.  
The EU was learning from its experiences though. The ENP process led to make the EU‟s 
strategy much apparent. Adopting a liberal thought the EU started to assess the developments 
in each partner country towards democratization based on participation in political life, 
enhancing the role of the civil society, guaranteeing judicial independence, and promoting 
human rights, fundamental freedoms and respect for the rule of law. However, when the 
current democracy promotion strategy is assessed on the financial aids through in comparison 
with EMP and also within itself; it seems that the EU still allocate funds regardless of the 
policies adopted during the formulation of the strategy, such as the non-existence of positive 
conditionality implications during ENP. The conclusion here is that if such democratization 
measures are not implemented with critical decisiveness; it will not be reasonable to talk 
about their weaknesses during implementation by claiming a number of reasons from the 
recipient country‟s conditions. 
Finally, the most current attempt by the EU through a differentiation approach, suggesting 
more incentives for the countries having more willingness to integrate with the EU, is 
promising for the EU‟s external actorness in the region for democracy promotion. As 
recognized in Jordan case, the EU‟s inclusion in the region is faster when the country itself is 
willing to integrate with the EU. Based on those results, one can claim that the EU can still 
make a difference in the region in future since the democracy promotion strategy gained 
ground for years, and the EU is now more got used to be interacted with the Mediterranean 
countries through information gathering and negotiating for certain issues. Moreover, the EU 
after the Arab Spring started to act in more decisive manner, through direct sanctions and 
implementing suspension clauses if the democratic principles and human rights are violated. 
Given this environment of the EU‟s appearance as an active democracy promoter, as a 
concluding recommendation, the EU should synergize its own political discourse by 
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considering its external actorness in the region and based on the existing comprehensive 
democracy promotion strategy, the implementation of the strategy in a credible way should 
continue to be a major focus of the European Union. 
  
60 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Accession criteria (Copenhagen criteria). (n.d.). Retrieved June 2013, from Europa: 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/accession_criteria_copenhague_en.ht
m 
ADE-EPU-NYUA-IBM. (2003). Evaluation of Economic Co-operation between the 
European Commission and Mediterranean Countries. Belgium. 
Aras, B., & Bıçakcı, S. (2006, September). Europe, Turkey and the Middle East: Is 
Harmonisation Possible? East European Quarterly, pp. 367-381. 
Axelrod, R., & Keohane, R. O. (1985, October). Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: 
Strategies and Institutions. World Politics, pp. 226-254. 
Barcelona Declaration. (1995, November 27-28). Retrieved November 18, 2012, from 
EEAS: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/july/tradoc_124236.pdf 
Beetham, D. (1997). Market economy and democratic polity. Democratization, pp. 76-93. 
Behr, T. (2010). Regional Integration in the Mediterranean Moving out of the Deadlock? 
Notre Europe, 1-84. 
Beichelt, T. (2012). The Research Field of Democracy Promotion. Living Reviews in 
Democracy. 
Bicchi, F. (2010, October 05). Dilemmas of implementation: EU democracy assistance in the 
Mediterranean. Democratization, pp. 976-996. 
Bicci, F. (2006). “Our Size Fits All”: Normative Power Europe and the Mediterranean. 
Journal of European Public Policy, pp. 286-303. 
Blaydes, L. (2011). Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt. Mexico: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Bomberg, E., & Stubb, A. (2003). The European Union: How Does It Work? Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Börzel, T. A., & Risse, T. (2009). The Transformative Power of Europe: The European 
Union and the Diffusion of Ideas. Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin. 
Burnell, P. (2004). The Domestic Political Impact of Foreign Aid: Recalibrating the Research 
Agenda. The European Journal of Developent Research, pp. 396-416. 
Calandri, E., Caviglia, D., & Varsori, A. (2012). Détente in Cold War Europe: Politics and 
Diplomacy in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. London: I.B. Tauris. 
Carbone, M. (2010). The European Union, Good Governance and Aid Co-ordination. Third 
World Quarterly, pp. 13-29. 
61 
 
Clapham, C. (1995). Political Conditionality and Structures of the African States. Africa 
Insight, pp. 91-241. 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. (1994, 
October 19). Mission of the European Communities. Retrieved March 2, 2013, from 
http://aei.pitt.edu/2950/1/2950.pdf 
Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community. (2006, December 29). Official Journal of the European Union. 
Corfu European Council. (1994, June 24-25). Retrieved November 18, 2012, from 
http://aei.pitt.edu/1444/1/corfu_june_1994.pdf 
Cornell, S. E. (2012, Winter). What Drives Turkish Foreign Policy? Changes in Turkey. The 
Middle East Quarterly, 19(1), pp. 13-24. 
Crawford, G. (1997). Foreign Aid and Political Conditionality: Issues of Effectiveness and 
Consistency. Democratization, pp. 69-108. 
Crowe, B. (2003, March). A Common European Foreign Policy after Iraq? International 
Affairs, s. 533-546. 
Dağdemir, E. U. (2008). Trade-Related Aspects of the European Neighbourhood Policy and 
the Prospective Role of Turkey in Energy Trade. Economic and Business Review, 
10(2), pp. 153-171. 
Dahl, R. A. (1998). On Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Dannreuther, R. (2006). Developing the Alternative to Enlargement: The European 
Neighbourhood Policy. European Foreign Affairs Review, pp. 183-201. 
Democracy Reporting International (DRI). (2007). Assessment of the Electoral Framework, 
Final Report: The Arab Republic of Egypt.  
Directorate General External Policies of the European Union. (2008, February). The Lisbon 
Treaty and Its Implications for CFSP/ESDP. Retrieved January 12, 2012 from 
European Parliament: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/200805/20080513ATT28796
/20080513ATT28796EN.pdf  
Düzgit, S. A., & Tocci, N. (2009). Transforming Turkish Foreign Policy: The Quest for 
Regional Leadership and Europeanisation. CEPS Commentary, 1-2. 
EEAS. (2009). EU positions on the Middle East peace process. Retrieved August 20, 2013, 
from EEAS: http://eeas.europa.eu/mepp/eu-positions/eu_positions_en.htm 
Emerson, M., & Tocci, N. (2004, August). Turkey as a Bridgehead and Spearhead: 
Integrating EU and Turkish Foreign Policy. Centre for European Policy Studies(1), 
pp. 1-35. 
62 
 
Estruch, E. (2007). European Instruments and Programmes Towards Southern 
Mediterranean . CeSPI. 
Ethier, D. (2003). Is Democracy Promotion Effective? Comparing Conditionality and 
Incentives. Democratization , pp. 99-120. 
EU Council. ([1996] OJ L 189/1). Council Regulation (EC) No 1488/96 of 23 July 1996 on 
financial and technical measures to accompany (MEDA) the reform of economic and 
social structured in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership.  
European Commission & High Representative. (2011). A New Response to a Changing 
Neighbourhood: Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. 
Brussels: COM(2011). 
European Commission. (2000). Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament to prepare the fourth meeting of Euro-mediterranean foreign 
ministers "reinvigorating the Barcelona process". Retrieved August 5, 2013, from 
eur-lex: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!DocNumber&lg=en&ty
pe_doc=COMfinal&an_doc=2000&nu_doc=497 
European Commission. (2004, May 12). European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper. 
Retrieved November 19, 2012, from COM(2004) 373 Final. Brussels: 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf 
European Commission. (2006, December 4). Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament on Strengthening the European 
Neighbourhood Policy. Retrieved November 30, 2012, from Europa: 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com06_726_en.pdf 
European Commission. (2007). Regional Strategy Paper (2007-2013) and Regional 
Indicative Programme (2007-2010). EuroMed. 
European Commission. (2011). Joint Communication: A Partnership for Democracy and 
Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean. Brussels. 
European Council Lisbon 1992. (1992). Presidency Conclusions. Retrieved December 13, 
2012, from European Parliament: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lisbon/li1_en.pdf 
European Council Meeting in Essen, Presidency Conclusions. (1994, December 9-10). 
Retrieved November 18, 2012, from 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00300-
1.EN4.htm 
European Union Center of North Carolina. (2008, March 2013). Turkey's Quest for EU 
membership. Retrieved from University of North Carolina: 
63 
 
http://www.unc.edu/depts/europe/business_media/mediabriefs/Brief4-0803-turkey's-
quest.pdf 
Fule, S. (2011, Summer). Turkey, the EU, and the European Neighbourhood Policy. Turkish 
Policy Quarterly, 10(2), pp. 17-21. 
Gault, J. (2004). The European Union: Energy Security and the Periphery. Occasional Paper 
Series No:40, pp. 3-20. 
Gillespie, R. (1997). Northern European Perceptions of the Barcelona Process. International 
Affairs, 37, pp. 65-75. 
Gomez, R. (2003). Negotiating the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. England: Ashgate 
Publishing Limited. 
Gomez, R. (2003). Negotiating the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Strategic Action in EU 
Foreign Policy? England: Ashgate. 
Gordon, P. H. (1997/98, Winter). Europe's Uncommon Foreign Policy. International 
Security, pp. 74-100. 
Gordon, P. H. (1997/98, Winter). Europe's Uncommon Foreign Policy. International 
Security, pp. 74-100. 
Gordon, P. H. (1998). Europe's Common Foreign and Security Policy. In A. Moravcsik, 
Centralization or Fragmentation (pp. 159-185). New York: Council on Foreign 
Relations Books. 
Gordon, P. H. (1998). The Limits of Europe's Common Foreign and Security Policy. A. 
Moravcsik, Centralization or Fragmentation? (s. 159-185). NY: Council of Foreign 
Relations Press. 
Grimm, S. (2009). External Democratization After War: Success and Failure. In W. Merkel, 
& S. Grimm, War and Democratization. Legality, Legitimacy and Effectiveness (pp. 
69-93). New York: Routledge. 
Haas, E. B. (1958). The Uniting of Europe. Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-
1957. 
Hille, P., & Knill, C. (2006). 'It's the Bureaucracy, Stupid':The Implementation of the Acquis 
Communautaire in EU Candidate Countries. European Union Politics, 531-552. 
Hoffman, S. (1966). Obstinate or Obsolete: the Fate of the Nation State and the Case of 
Western Europe. Daedalus, pp. 862-915. 
Hüllen, V. v. (2009). EU Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean: Cooperation against 
All Odds? Berlin: KFG The Transformative Power of Europe. 
64 
 
Huntington, S. (1991). The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. 
Numa, Okla: University of Oklahoma Press. 
Hurd, I. (1999). Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics. International 
Organization, pp. 379-408. 
Jachtenfuchs, M. (2001). The Governance Approach to European Integration. Journal of 
Common Market Studies, pp. 245-264. 
Kaldor, M. (1999). Transnational Civil Society. In T. Dunne, & N. Wheeler, Human Rights in 
Global Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kane, T. (2008). Emerging Conflicts of Principle. England: Ashgate Publishing Limited. 
Kegley, C. W. (1992). The New Global Order: The Power of Principle in a Pluralistic World. 
Ethics and International Affairs, pp. 21-40. 
Keukeleire, S., & MacNaughtan, J. (2008). The Foreign Policy of the European Union. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Kienle, E. (2009, July 24). More than a response to Islamism: The Political Deliberalization 
of Egypt in the 1990s. The Middle East Journal, 52(2), pp. 219-235. 
Kienle, E. (2012). Ambiguities and Misconceptions:European Policies towards Political 
Reform in the Southern Mediterranean. EEAS. 
Kirişçi, K. (2011). The EU, Turkey and the Arab Spring: Challenges and Opportunities for 
Regional Integration. Working Paper 01. Global Turkey in Europe. 
Kubicek, P. J. (2003). International norms, the European Union, and democratization: 
tentative theory and evidence. In P. J. Kubicek, The European Union and 
Democratization (pp. 1-29). New York: Routledge. 
LaGro, E. (2003). A Note on the Euro-mediterranean Partnership and the Role of Turkey. 
Observatory of European Foreign Policy. 
Laschi, G. (2011, April). The Mediterranean Region, between European Strategies and 
National Interests. European Perspectives – Journal on European Perspectives of the 
Western Balkans, 3(1 (4)), pp. 35-56. 
Laursen, F. (2010). The EU as an International Political and Security Actor after the Treaty of 
Lisbon: An Academic Perspective. Global Jean Monnet/ECSA -World Conference 
2010, (s. 1-23). Brussels. 
Lawson, L. (1999). External democracy promotion in Africa: Another false start? 
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, pp. 1-30. 
Leal, I. d., & Deka, J. (2004). Euro-Med Association Agreements Implementation Guide. 
Brussels: RELEX F. 
65 
 
Lecha, E. S. (2008). Spain and the Mediterranean: in defence of the Barcelona Process. In E. 
Barbé, Spain in Europe 2004-2008. Barcelona: Institut Universitari d‟Estudis 
Europeus . 
Linz, J. J., & Stepan, A. (1996). Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: 
Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. USA: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press. 
Lippert, B. (2007, July). The Discussion on EU Neighbourhood Policy – Concepts, Reform 
Proposals and National Positions. International Policy Analysis, pp. 1-27. 
Mahncke, D., & Gstöhl, S. (2008). Europe's Near Abroad: Promises and Prospects of the 
EU's Neighbourhood Policy. Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang. 
Maurer, H. (2012). From regional power to global power? The European Neighbourhood 
Policy after the Lisbon Treaty. Maastricht: Maastricht University. 
McCormick, J. (1999). Undertanding the European Union: A Concise Introduction. New 
York: Palgrave. 
Mendelson, S. E. (2002). Conclusion: The Power and Limits of Transnational Democracy 
Networks in Postcommunist Societies. In S. E. Mendelson, & J. K. Glenn, The Power 
and Limits of NGOs: A critical look at building democracy in Eastern Europe and 
Eurasia (pp. 232-251). Columbia: Columbia University Press. 
Molla, N. K. (2009). The EU‟s Role in Political Reform and Democracy Building in the 
Southern Mediterranean Region: An Egyptian Perspective. International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance. 
Moore, B. (1996). Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasent in the 
Making of the Modern World. Boston: Beacon. 
Moravcsik, A. (1991, Winter). Negotiating the Single European Act: national interests and 
conventional statecraft in the European Community. International Organization, pp. 
19-56. 
Moravcsik, A. (1998). Centralization or Fragmentation?: Europe Facing the Challenges of 
Deepening, Diversity and Democracy. NY: Council on Foreign Relations. 
Moravcsik, A. (1998). De Gaulle and European Integration: Historical Revision and Social 
Science Theory. Center for European Studies Working Paper Series, pp. 1-84. 
Moravcsik, A. (1998). De Gaulle and European Integration: Historical Revision and Social 
Science Theory. Center for European Studies Working Paper Series, 1-84. 
Moravcsik, A. (1998). The Choice for Europe – Social Purpose and State Power from 
Messina to Maastricht. England: Cornell University. 
66 
 
Moravscik, A. (1991, Winter). Negotiating the Single European Act: national interests and 
conventional statecraft in the European Community. International Organization, s. 
19-56. 
Moravscik, A. (1998). Europe's Integration at Century's End. A. Moravscik, Centralization or 
Fragmentation? (s. 1-58). NY: Council on Foreign Relations Press. 
Moravscik, A. (1998). The Choice for Europe – Social Purpose and State Power from 
Messina to Maastricht. England: Cornell University. 
Müftüler-Baç, M. (2007). The European Union and its Common Defense and Security Policy. 
In Y. A. (ed.), State of the European Union. London: Ashgate press. 
Özcan, M. (2008). Harmonizing Foreign Policy: Turkey, the EU and the Middle East. 
England: Ashgate Publishing Limited. 
Palombo, M. (2013, February). Of crises and carrots: reflections on enlargement. Nouvelle 
Europe [en ligne]. 
Pierros, F., Meunier, J., & Abrams, S. (1999). Bridges and Barriers: The European Union's 
Mediterranean Policy, 1961-1998. England: Ashgate Publishing. 
Prodi, R. (2002, December 5-6). A Wider Europe: A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability. 
Retrieved November 19, 2012, from ECSA World Conference SPEECH/02/619, 
Brussels: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/02/619 
Przeworski, A. (1991). Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reformsin 
Eastern Europe and Latin America . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Raffaella A. Del Sarto, T. S. (2005). From EMP to ENP: What's at Stake with the European 
Neighbourhood Policy towards the Southern Mediterranean? European Foreign 
Affairs Review, 10, pp. 17-38. 
Rueschemeyer, D., Stephens, E., & Stephens, J. (1992). Capitalist Development and 
Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Scarpetta, V., & Swidlicki, P. (2011). The EU and the Mediterranean: Good Neighbours? 
London: Openeurope. 
Schimmelfennig, F. (2010). Europeanization beyond the member states. Retrieved June 2013, 
from 
http://www.eup.ethz.ch/people/schimmelfennig/publications/10_ZSE_Europeanizatio
n__manuscript_.pdf 
Schimmelfennig, F., & Sedelmeier, U. (2004). Governance by conditionality: EU rule 
transfer to the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Journal of 
European Public Policy, pp. 669–687. 
67 
 
Schimmelfennig, F., & Sedelmeier, U. (2005). The Europeanization of Central and Eastern 
Europe. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Schmid, D. (2013). Interlinkages Within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Linking 
Economic, Institutional and Political Reform: Conditionality Within the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership. EuroMeSCo, 1-63. 
Schmitter, P. C. (2001). The Influence of the International Context Upon the Choice of 
National Institutions and Policies in Neo‐Democracies. In L. Whitehead, The 
International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Schraeder, P. (2003). The state of the Art in International Democracy Promotion: Results of a 
Joint European-North American Research Network. Democratization, pp. 21-44. 
Slapin, J. B. (2006, February 7). Who Is Powerful? Examining Preferences and Testing 
Sources of Bargaining Strength at European Intergovernmental Conferences. 
European Union Politics, s. 51-75. 
Smith, K. E. (2003). EU external relations. In M. C. (ed.), European Union politics (pp. 229-
245). Oxford: Oxford University Press ISBN 0199248362. 
Smith, M. E. (2004). Europe's Foreign and Security Policy. United Kingdom: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Solano, J. (2003). Old and New Challenges of the Barcelona Process. Naples. 
Sourander, D. (2008, July). The Union's External Relations: European Neighbourhood 
Policy. Retrieved November 28, 2012, from European Parliament: 
http://circa.europa.eu/irc/opoce/fact_sheets/info/data/relations/framework/article_723
9_en.htm 
Staab, A. (2008). The European Union Explained. USA: Indiana University Press. 
Standard Eurobarometer 73. (2010, August). Retrieved on January 15, 2012 from European 
Commission Public Opinion: 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb73/eb73_first_en.pdf  
Stetter, S. (2004). Democratization without Democracy? The assistance of the European 
Union for Democratization Processes in Palestine. In A. Jünemann, Euro-
Mediterranean Relations After September 11: International, Regional and Domestic 
Dynamics (pp. 153-173). London: Frank Cass. 
Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union. (1997, October 2). Retrieved 
December 30, 2012, from Europa: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/treaty/pdf/amst-en.pdf 
68 
 
The Maastricht Treaty Treaty on European Union. (1992, February 7). European Treaties. 
Retrieved from http://www.eurotreaties.com/maastrichteu.pdf 
The Single European Act, Title III. (1986). Retrieved December 30, 2012, from Europa.eu: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documents/treaties/singleuropeana
ct.pdf 
Tsoukalis, L. (1977, July). The EEC and the Mediterranean: Is 'Global' Policy a Misnomer? 
International Affairs, 53(3), pp. 422-438. 
United Nations. (1969, May 23). Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Treaty Series, p. 
331. 
Weichert, T. (2010, June 30). Lisbon Treaty and CFSP: Will there be increased Integration?. 
Retrieved on January 15, 2012 from Universitet Twente URL: 
http://essay.utwente.nl/60287/1/MA_thesis_T_Weichert.pdf  
Whitehead, L. (1996). The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the 
Americas. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
World Bank. (1998). Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn't, and Why. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Youngs, R. (2001). The European Union and the Promotion of Democracy. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
